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ABSTRACT 
This study endeavored to establish the effects of tax compliance strategies expenditure on 
government tax revenue. The specific objectives of the study were to: establish the effect 
of tax payer education expenditure on tax revenue, determine the effect of improved tax 
payer services expenditure on tax revenue, and assess the effect of law enforcement 
expenditure on tax revenue as well as determine the effect of technology adoption 
expenditure on tax revenue. The study was pegged on three theories namely; the 
economic deterrence theory, fiscal exchange theory and the regulatory compliance 
theory. Revenue data between 1980 and 2015 was used in the study. Ordinary Least 
Squares technique (OLS) was employed to establish the long run relationship between 
expenditure on taxpayer education, tax payer services, expenditure on law enforcement 
and adoption of technology on government tax revenues. Breusch-pagan test was used to 
test for heteroscedasticity and multi-collinearity, Variance Inflation Factor method was 
used. The study tested for serial autocorrelation since the data was of time series nature. 
The Jarque-Bera test was also conducted to test normality for the error term. Impulse 
response and variance decomposition were used to test the relation between tax 
compliance strategies expenditure and tax revenue. Further, the relationship between 
variables was established through correlation analysis. The results of the study show that 
the expenditures by the tax authority on the use of technology, law enforcement and the 
tax payer education were statistically significant in explaining the variations in tax 
revenue. The relationship between the three expenditures and revenue is positive, which 
implies that as the tax authority increases its expenditure on law enforcement, technology 
or on tax payer education, it is expected that tax revenue will grow. Contrary to these 
findings is the fact that the expenditure of the tax authority on improved tax payer 
services is not significant in explaining the variations in tax revenue.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the background to the study, the statement of the problem, study 
objectives and the research questions. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the scope of 
the study, justification of the study, significance of the study, limitations of the study and 
finally the operational definitions of terms. 
1.2 Background to the study. 
Marina et al., (2002) asserts that the sole and realistic way of mobilizing resources to 
meet public expenditure on goods and services required by the citizenry is taxation. But 
this is not entirely the case since some third world countries have alternative sources of 
revenue besides taxation like user fees and licenses levied on services provided by 
government ministries, departments and state agencies, including proceeds from the 
disposal of public assets and denationalization of „ailing‟ state corporations. Furthermore, 
a number of emerging economies rely heavily on external funding as an alternative 
source of income (Barnett and Grown, 2004). 
Generating revenue locally is given precedence by many nations in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Drummond et al., 2012). Raising revenue enables many governments in developing 
countries achieve financial superiority, avail basic state amenities to its people, lower 
dependency on external support which in most cases has strings attached and diversify 
sources of revenue. On the contrary, tax avoidance and evasion in the local scene has 
hampered the growth of domestic tax base (IMF 2011).  Even with the increasing and 
persistent world-wide challenge of tax non-compliance (McKerchar and Evans 2009), it 
is evident that most developing economies especially in the sub-Saharan Africa are the 
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worst affected (Cobham 2005; Fuest and Riedel 2009).  Masinde and Makau, (2010)  
assert that taxes are crucial in budgetary projections of an economy and one of the major 
reasons why taxes are levied is to raise revenue for economic management and allocation 
of resources for economic stabilization. Numerous interventions in the form of 
administrative initiatives have been put in place in the past by the Kenyan Government to 
enhance revenue generation. Among the interventions implemented to boost tax revenue 
was self-assessment systems (SAS) in the year 1992. The aim of the strategy was to 
enhance voluntary compliance, ease the complexity involved in evaluating tax returns 
and make the process of raising tax revenue more effective ( cut down the cost of 
collecting tax revenue)   (Masinde et al,. 2010). Even with the various tax management 
changes, the degree of adherence to revenue collection regulations has remained minimal. 
A study carried out by KRA, KIPPRA and the ministry of finance, based on 1999/2000 
statistics showed that the amount of Value added tax remitted was minimal at 55% and 
the compliance on self-assessment tax returns through lodgment was 65% (Makau et al,. 
2010). 
Handling the perennial challenge of tax nonpayment demands for the tax authorities to 
clearly identify the elements that contribute to an individual‟s tendency to fulfill or fail to 
honor his or her tax obligations. Unfortunately, not much is understood concerning the 
dynamics of tax compliance in third world economies (Andreoni et al., 1998; D'Arcy 
2011; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001). The tax compliance challenge has two main 
approaches the first is derived from economic rationality that is based on economic 
analysis and the second approach concerns with issues of behavior and borrows heavily 
from ideas and research findings in other fields like psychology and sociology (OECD, 
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2004). These two approaches are often perceived to provide alternative explanations on 
tax compliance (Valeria, 2004). 
According to Jamel and Michael (2001) the economic approach gives economic variables 
that influence the behavior of tax compliance such as financial constraints that points to 
the relationship between tax liability and compliance behavior of the tax payer. If the tax 
liability is within the tax payer‟s ability, there is a high likelihood of voluntary 
compliance (Alligahm and Sandmo, 2004). Tax is the main form of raising government 
revenue by the Kenyan government which it requires to provide public amenities to its 
population.  From the 1990s, Kenya achieved a significant growth in tax collection in 
nominal terms constituting about 24% of its GDP (Kenya Economic Report, 2013) 
making it possible for the state to cater for 60% of its budget (Kenya Economic Report, 
2013). Machogu and Amayi (2013) noted that the debates around tax policies and public 
participation in decision making were a crucial public concern, to individual business 
enterprises and to the whole economy because of the varied effects on each of the 
entities. Consequently, tax related inequalities emanate from differences in the structure 
and performance of the tax system and therefore it is the responsibility of the state to 
institute a just and fair tax regime for balanced distribution of income and welfare 
services to its citizens. Additionally, the other significant indicators of a just and fair tax 
regime are simplicity, adequacy and neutrality. The promulgation of the new constitution 
in Kenya in 2010 has brought about a two tier system of governance; the national and 47 
county governments (GOK, 2010).  
The new constitution accords the central government the responsibility of levying both 
direct taxes (Income and corporate taxes) as well as indirect taxes (VAT, excise and 
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customs duty). Income tax forms about 40% of the total tax revenue raised by the 
national government over last 10 years, followed by Value Added Tax at 28%. 
Approximately 20% of the economically active work force bears the burden of paying the 
income taxes such as PAYE which has raised fairness related issues besides the fact it is 
regarded as the most progressive tax arrangement (Karingi et al., 2005). Alternatively the 
county governments are mandated to levy property rates, entertainment levies and any 
other taxes by an Act of parliament (Parliament Budget Office, 2010). Both the central 
and devolved units of government may levy service charges.  The county governments 
have limited powers to tax and raise revenues in a manner that does not contravene and 
prejudice the provisions of the national economic policies as well as economic 
engagements within the county and should not hinder the free flow of goods, services, 
capital or labour. The equitable distribution of national revenue raised by both the central 
and county governments is regulated by the recommendations of the Commission for 
revenue allocation (Institute of Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), 2011). 
According to Okello (2001) the government should consider widening the tax bracket in 
its tax reforms agenda instead of relying on tax credits and deductions like tax reliefs as a 
means to achieving fairness in tax administration.  This can be achieved by instituting 
high tax rates for upper income tax brackets alongside the adjustment of tax bands to 
limit salary increments that are responsive to inflationary pressures without necessarily 
pushing the citizen‟s income to higher tax bands. However, Masinde and Muyundo 
(2012) note that corporate income tax is based on a fixed rate of 30% on net profits for 
local corporate entities as opposed to personal income tax that is based on a graduated tax 
scale structure. But those firms operating in the informal sector evade paying tax and this 
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raises equity concerns even after the government introduced turnover tax to net such 
entities. That initiative has not been significantly successful raising the question as to 
whether the tax incentive regime should be revised in order to meet the main aim of 
enhancing investment and reducing revenue loss by the government (Mankiw, 1998). 
Achieving improved tax compliance requires sustained and long range reform efforts 
based on very strong organizations and prudently managed Kenya Revenue Authority as 
well as having in place a collection system that is robust (e.g., payment and withholding 
systems) with regard to establishing a tax administration system that has the capacity to 
enforce registration, filing, payment, debt collection, audit,  provide relevant and 
necessary services to tax payers, and processing of appeals) (Marina and Kilis, 2002). To 
ensure that the penalties are imposed as required, disputes resolved amicably and 
sufficient powers are vested on the tax agencies, the legal framework and the judiciary 
should play a major role. This coupled with increased use of   information and 
communications technology plays an important role in tax compliance management by 
facilitating collection of information relating to third parties on their business activities, 
the use of electronic invoices to achieve monitoring  and verification of transactions on a 
real time basis and analysis business risks (KNBS, 2011). Different countries and regions 
have adopted different strategies to achieve improved tax compliance. The differences are 
justified by the different stages of development, diverse administrative capacities and 
different non-compliance scopes. Therefore no single solution to tax compliance problem 
exists for all countries. The reforms implemented should be structured to fit the different 
circumstances of each country. The third world countries have however shown greater 
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potential of achieving tax revenue growth by implementing tax compliance reform 
initiatives (GOK, 2010).  
The allocation towards economic development from the total national budget in the 
financial year 2009/10 increased from 27.7% to 30.2% in the fiscal year 2011/12 but 
dropped slightly to 27.4% in the year 2013/14. The government of Kenya also planned 
for development financing allocations for all the 47 counties in the 2012/13, 2013/14 and 
2014/15 fiscal years in line with the broad government objective of assigning more 
resources to infrastructure development and encourage private investments to create a 
firm foundation for high economic growth and development as outlined in the Vision 
2030 which forms Kenya‟s long-term development agenda (Kenya Economic Report, 
2013). 
According to Masinde and Makau, (2010), taxes play an important role in the budget of 
any economy and one of the main reasons why the government imposes taxes is to 
generate income to manage the economy and redistribute resources. Over the years, the 
Kenya government has undertaken various revenue administration reforms aimed at 
enhancing revenue collection. One of the measures that have been implemented in order 
to increase revenue collection in Kenya was the introduction of self-assessment systems 
(SAS) in 1992. The objectives of this system was to increase voluntary compliance, 
reduce tax authorities‟  burden of assessing tax returns and increase tax collection 
efficiency (reduce tax collection costs) (Masinde et al., 2010). However despite various 
administrative reforms, levels of tax compliance have remained quite low. A survey 
conducted by KRA, KIPPRA and the Treasury, based on 1999/2000 data revealed that 
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VAT payment compliance was as low as 55% while return lodgment compliance was 
65% (Makau et al., 2010). 
Several important revenue measures were included in the 2014/15. Such measures ranged 
from revision of the Excise and Income tax Acts, increased taxes on iron and steel 
products, enhanced and better tax administration, more specifically in relation to value 
Added Tax and changes to the  Income Tax Act  to curb tax avoidance by  international 
firms operating in Kenya. The reforms initiated and effected in September 2013 reflected 
the full year effects of value Added Tax reforms that led to increased revenues as well as 
the impact of the measures that led to the incorporation of the land lord into the tax base. 
The measures were expected to contribute about 1.3% of GDP in 2014/15 (GOK, 2015). 
Aggregate tax revenue  as a percentage of the GDP was expected  to average 22% in the 
subsequent two fiscal years whereas total expenditure and net lending were to remain 
above 30%, and the overall budget deficit was to continue to be above 8% of the GDP 
(Odero, Kipyego and Reeves, 2015: 2). 
1.2.1 Tax Compliance Strategies. 
Tax compliance is a major problem for many tax authorities and it is not easy task to 
persuade taxpayers to comply with tax requirements even though tax laws are not always 
precise‟  (James and Alley 2004).The definition of tax compliance in its most simple 
form is usually cast in terms of the degree to which taxpayers comply with the tax law 
(James 1999).However, like many such concepts, compliance is seen as a continuum of 
definitions. One suggestion is that the degree of non-compliance may be measured in 
terms of the „tax gap‟ . This represents the difference between the actual revenue 
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collected and the amount that would be collected if there was 100% compliance (James, 
1999).  
All revenue authorities are generally required to achieve as good a compliance outcome 
as possible (i.e., to maximize the overall level of compliance with the tax laws). For this 
purpose, they are appropriated a finite level of resources, meaning that careful decisions 
are required as to how and in what ways those resources are to be applied to achieve the 
best possible outcome in terms of improved compliance with the tax laws. Directly 
related to this issue is the critical matter of deciding the priorities for compliance action 
and the specific actions to be taken (Jamel and Michael, 2001). The primary goal of a 
revenue authority is to collect the taxes and duties payable in accordance with the law 
and to do this in such manner that will sustain confidence in the tax system and its 
administration. The actions of taxpayers, whether due to ignorance, carelessness, 
recklessness, or deliberate evasion as well as weaknesses in a tax administration, mean 
that instances of failure to comply with the law are inevitable. Therefore, tax 
administration should have in place strategies and structures to ensure that non-
compliance with tax law is kept to a minimum (Gardiner, 2001). 
Jackson (2013) argues that improving tax compliance requires long-term reform efforts, 
beginning with strengthening the organization and management of the revenue agency, 
implementing robust collection systems (e.g., payment and withholding systems) and 
building capacity in core tax administration functions (registration, filing and payment 
enforcement, debt collection, audit, taxpayer services, and processing of appeals). Keen 
et al. (2013) argue that reform of the legal framework and judiciary is also often required 
to ensure that the necessary powers, penalty regimes, and dispute resolution processes are 
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in place. Increasingly, information and communications technology is playing a critical 
role in compliance management (e.g., through automatic gathering of third-party 
information as a by-product of natural business processes; use of electronic invoices to 
facilitate real-time transaction monitoring and verification; and analysis of revenue risks). 
Reform priorities to improve tax compliance differ across countries and regions, 
reflecting variations in stages of development, administrative capacity, and scope of tax 
abuse. One size does not fit all, so reforms need to be tailored to each country‟s 
circumstances. The relatively wider tax gaps and lower revenue productivity of 
developing and emerging economies generally suggest potential for bigger revenue yields 
from compliance improvement initiatives. For these countries, getting the fundamentals 
of revenue administration in place (especially taxpayer service operations and effective 
audit and enforcement) should be the first step (Machogu&Amayi 2013).According to the 
Tax Justice Network Africa, (2011) a taxpayer compliance program is a high level plan 
which brings together in a single document a description of the most significant 
compliance risks identified in the tax system and sets out the broad detail of how the 
revenue agency intends to respond to those risks. It does not attempt to cover every 
aspect of a revenue agency‟s operational activities. Compliance programs are commonly 
structured around major taxpayer segments (e.g., large businesses, medium-size 
enterprises, small and micro enterprises, and individuals) and address compliance risks 
relevant to these segments (Spitzer, 2003). 
While sound legislation is the cornerstone of achieving a good compliance outcome, it is 
nevertheless often a costly response to any given non-compliance situation. As a 
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consequence, consideration of the external legislative context represents an attempt to 
look at existing legislation in action in an effort to identify weaknesses and threats that 
may need to be addressed or mitigated through administrative practices. The role of the 
authority is to operate within the law. Whilst recommending changes to legislation does 
represent a legitimate compliance approach for revenue authorities, this guidance note 
concentrates on administrative rather than legislative solutions (Tanzi& Zee, 2000).  
Revenue authorities throughout the world operate within socio-political contexts. From 
time to time, governments will place obligations upon authorities that might not have 
otherwise represented a compliance risk worthy of administrative intervention. These 
additional obligations nevertheless form part of the context within which the authority 
must operate and represent a very real impost on resource allocation and usage that must 
be managed.  Public opinion represents an important consideration for revenue 
authorities. The regard in which an authority is held within the community has a direct 
impact not only upon the community attitude towards compliance but also upon the 
ability of the revenue authority to successfully administer the taxation system and upon 
the morale of revenue agency staff (Tax Justice Network Africa, 2011). 
Spitzer (2003) explains that in a world of limited resources, the manner in which a 
compliance risk is to be addressed must be taken into consideration. This is not only 
because of the need to spread resources to achieve a balanced programme of compliance 
activity but also to ensure that the manner of treatment is acceptable to community 
standards. The costs of compliance to the community need to be commensurate with the 
level of compliance risk exposure if the county is to be able to meet its global objectives 
of collecting the revenue in a manner that sustains community confidence. Community 
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standards and the potential impact of compliance obligations are aspects of the operating 
context that a county management must clearly understand in order to frame an effective 
compliance treatment programme. 
 
Jackson (2013) argues that improving tax compliance requires long-term reform efforts. 
This may begin with strengthening the organization and management of the revenue 
agency, implementing robust collection systems (e.g., payment and withholding systems) 
and building capacity in core tax administration functions (registration, filing and 
payment enforcement, debt collection, audit, taxpayer services, and processing of 
appeals). Keen et al., (2013) argue that reform of the legal framework and judiciary is 
also often required to ensure that the necessary powers, penalty regimes, and dispute 
resolution processes are in place. Increasingly, information and communications 
technology are playing a critical role in compliance management (e.g., through an 
automatic gathering of third-party information as a by-product of natural business 
processes; use of electronic invoices to facilitate real-time transaction monitoring and 
verification; and analysis of revenue risks). 
Nicoleta (2011) in his study says that tax noncompliance is a substantive universal 
phenomenon that transcends cultural and political boundaries and takes place in all 
societies and economic systems. There are many studies that explain the behavior of tax 
compliance in a more realistic situation. They focus on the determinants of tax 
compliance, respectively on economic and non-economic factors. Tax non-compliance is 
an area of concern for all government and tax authorities, and it continues to be an 
important issue that must be addressed. Regardless of time and place, the main issue 
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faced by all tax authorities is that it has never been easy to persuade all taxpayers to 
comply with the regulations of a tax system. In contrast to the majority of employed 
people - who in many countries are paid net salaries with taxes being deducted at source 
–residential estate investors often need to self-assess and self-report their income and pay 
taxes "out of their pocket." Residential estate investors not only pay their income tax but 
need to take account of various types of business taxes such as corporate tax, property 
taxes, and payroll taxes; they need to collect sales taxes such as VAT; and they need to 
withhold taxes such as personal income taxes in the case of having at least one employee 
(Christensen et al., 2001).  
Jayapalan (2003) asserts that the key objective of the tax agency is to levy taxes and other 
fees as required by the law and do to it in a way that aims to achieve and maintain the 
confidence of the tax regime and its management. However, cases of noncompliance with 
tax regulations by the tax payers, either because of lack of information, laziness, 
recklessness, or by willingly evading, and also loopholes in a tax arrangement are 
unavoidable. Consequently, any administration of tax is required to put in place 
mechanisms and policies that make it hard for any attempt to avoid adherence to the tax 
regulations difficult and unachievable. The fundamental role of a tax agency (and vested 
interest) is to ensure that taxpayers and other stakeholders are well aware of their 
requirements as dictated by the tax laws of the country (Gardiner, 2001).  Taxpayers on 
their side have  a crucial and essential responsibility to fulfill in order to meet their 
obligations, because in many occasions they in a better position to understand it is their 
duty to follow the tax laws in its entirety (Siti, Normala Sheik & Obid, 2007).  
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While individual responsibilities rested upon a taxpayer are bound to change from a 
single taxation duty to another and from one tax mandate to the other, a minimum of four 
general classes of requirements are possible to prevail for all the taxpayers, irrespective 
of the tax jurisdiction. „Adherence' to a greater proportion will depend on the degree to 
which a taxpayer fulfills these expectations. Failure by the taxpayers to adhere to the 
requirements may then be taken to mean lack of compliance. Although, degrees of non-
compliance are varied (Burrows, 2013).similarly, individuals expected to pay tax may 
fundamentally meet their requirements, but adherence may still have clear concerns 
stemming from varied interpretations and understanding of the tax laws. In such 
circumstances, failure to clearly understand the tax regulations presents a dimension of 
risk that can only be dealt with either by amending the law or finding alternative ways in 
which the law will be enforced (Alligahm and Sandmo, 2004).  Tax agencies are 
allocated a fixed amount of resources, fundamentally clearly less than the required to 
enhance total percentage compliance by all taxpayers as tax obligations keep on surging 
high. This implies that effective tax management should be about maximizing collections 
as required by the tax laws in the manner that enhances public confidence in the revenue 
collection agency and in a way that provides a just and correct working of the tax system. 
Consequently, tax collection agencies need a formulae or technique for the effective and 
balanced mode of distributing resources at their disposal. However, this is not a clear-cut 
assumption with regard to tax and tax compliance (Machogu and Amayi, 2013). The 
main goal of tax management could be in relation with maximizing revenue collections 
as per the tax requirements and raising the degree of voluntary compliance in a manner 
that fosters the integrity of the tax system, but the approach to attaining this may not be.  
14 
 
Efficiency relies heavily on creativity and cooperation in learning the market, 
environment, identifying differences and coming up with strategies (Dicleson & 
Hadjimanolis, 2008). Governments avail different services to their population that 
include education, sanitation, security, roads, health care, water, and social security 
especially for care of the elderly, among others. The provision of this goods and services 
can only be achieved by the governments collectively using taxes and the other 
alternative sources of income as stated earlier on. Fundamentally, taxes are obligatory 
levies that may not necessarily be in return for benefits from government provisions to its 
(GOK, 2010). It is significant to understand that, honoring tax requirements should not be 
in anticipation for immediate and correspondent service in return. The rationale for 
paying taxes is that an individual person cannot afford to pay for a service they use fully 
and therefore it is the responsibility of governments to administer and raise taxes to 
finance the provision of public goods and facilities for the benefit of the citizens (Karingi 
et al., 2005). 
1.2.2   Tax compliance and tax revenue 
According to ITEP (2011), a great proportion of revenue authorities have digressed from 
the traditional tax management assessment regimes where all or to a larger extent tax 
reports are scrutinized or examined as a precondition for before being issued to the 
taxpayers. The regime of choice of late is the self-evaluation and adjustment mechanism 
that bases its confidence on the taxpayer‟s own initiative to adhere to their tax obligations 
to subscribe to the tax register, maintain up to date records, submit accurate tax returns 
and honour their tax liabilities with minimum or without the intervention of a tax body. 
Article 209 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 prescribes the right to levy taxes or 
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accumulate revenue for both the central government and the devolved units of 
governance (GOK, 2011). The distribution of the tax collection authority between the two 
levels of government is meant to respect and enhance the spirit of devolution, whose 
structure makes it possible for the central government to have greater mandate over a 
bigger portion of taxes with substantial revenue base. Specifically, the central 
government is particularly in charge of imposing income tax, excise duties, VAT, and 
customs (GOK, 2010).   
About 20% Kenya's tax income-to-GDP ratio from the year of 2010 has been the best in 
standards by regional comparisons; this is far above the tax-to-GDP ratios in Tanzania 
(17.4% in the fiscal year 2013/14) and Uganda (13% in fiscal year 2013/14). The 
economic short fall (including foreign aid) was approximately 5% of the gross domestic 
product running over the financial periods of 2011/12 and 2012/13, growing up to 5.6% 
from 4.0%, respectively. This development remained constant besides the adoption of 
new and advanced systems and structures to operationalize the 2010 supreme law in 
Kenya (the constitution), both at the central government level as well as among the 47 
devolved units of government, that has made it necessary for the state to expand its 
expenditure; and increased demands by government employees to have their basic pay 
and other employment allowances (Odero, Reeves & Kipyego, 2015: 12).  
The taxpayers' belief and tendency to comply is always a consequence of a number of 
elements of compliance that finally affect taxpayer's attitude. The conditions that affect 
adherence to tax requirements and failure to voluntarily honour tax obligations by 
individual taxpayers are not uniform among different economies and also are different 
from one tax entity to (Kirchler, 2007). These range from taxpayer attitude towards the 
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tax regime and the tax collection agency (Ambrecht, 1998) group pressures and or  
individualized practices; taxpayer awareness regarding the workings of the tax system/tax 
regulations (Silvani, 1992; Le Baube, 1992).Including other benefits such as motivational 
incentives (Feld, Frey and Targler, 2006) and coercive forms like fines (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972); high penalties in case of non-compliance (Slemrod, 1992; Le Baube, 
1992);implementation activities that include regular tax audits; possibility of non-
compliance discovery; variance across social cultures; preconceived behaviour regulation 
(Furnharn, 1983); norms/ morals by the tax paying agents and tax administrators; fairness 
of the revenue regimes; population dynamics and composition elements like gender, age, 
literacy levels and the level of revenue (Murphy, 2004) and the dependency on informers. 
Adherence to tax obligations has gradually developed and grown into a major field of 
focus for studies in social and financial psychology. This concept has been looked at and 
tackled from a variety of standpoints leading to the understanding of the varied aspects of 
behavioral attitudes by the tax payers. Attitudes of a tax payer have been determined, 
current cultural practices defined and the lay philosophies held by people with regard to 
fulfilling their yearly tax liabilities and declarations examined (Kirchler, 2007). 
Experimental findings point to the fact that adherence to taxation requirements has 
resulted in higher and rising levels of government revenue and verification reports and a 
generally encouraging decline in the overall tax rates based on yearly tax returns. Tax 
liability payment will also be highly efficient when the tax payer anticipate improvement 
in provision of welfare amenities paid for by the tax revenue with any change in 
percentage penalties appearing to cause minimal impact on tax liability payment 
tendency (Almet et al., 1992). To conclude, there seems to be a range of alternative tax 
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regulation elements superior to the normal routine of implementation activities that the 
state can put in place to realize and even exceed the expected or projected level of 
adherence with the tax collection and administration conditions. Essentially, a number of 
these fundamental strategies (increased fines) may to a greater extent fail to trigger any 
increase in the levels of compliance to tax requirements.  
It recommended that the state pursues alternative measures in its quest to improve on the 
level of tax efficiency and effectiveness (Alm et al., 1992). Therefore, the administration 
of coercive measures such as fines and other non-compliance costs should be encouraged 
to minimize further delayed payment of the tax liabilities. It therefore follows that tax 
audits by tax management agencies should be considered necessary and compulsory, 
specifically when non-compliance is detected or suspected to have been committed by the 
tax paying entity be ignorantly or intentionally. The concept non-compliance has always 
been emphasized by the policy changes geared to punish, such as the regular tax audits 
and percentage fines (Alm, McClelland, Schulze, 1992). Unfortunately, the theoretical 
instrument employed could not extensively predict and give a comprehensive account of 
the taxpayer reluctant attitude and more often refusal to comply with tax payment. 
Several empirical studies to explain the complex and unpredictable tendency of 
adherence to tax regulations in more genuine circumstances have been carried out. These 
studies concerned themselves with the elements that influence compliance or levels of 
non-compliance. This could be respectively on economic and non‐economic elements. 
Non‐financial elements, initially assumed by early economic proponents, are now 
considered in crucial in helping the understanding of the adherence to tax regulations 
through the use of an economic structure (Smith and Stalans, 1991). These economists 
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have considered a number of  non‐economic determinants, that  range from the general 
willingness to honor liability for government provisions, general education, tax attitude, 
etc. (Hyun, 2005) 
1.3   Statement of the Problem. 
Efficient self-assessment structures are reinforced by a controlling approach that 
identifies that voluntary compliance will be optimized through an appropriate balance of 
taxpayer education and assistance, simple laws and procedures, and risk-based 
verification programs. Article 209 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) outlines powers to 
impose taxes or raise revenue by the national government (GOK, 2011). In particular, the 
national government is solely responsible for imposing income tax, value added tax, 
customs duties and excise taxes. The justification for this is that the central government 
needs to retain the ability to redistribute national resources and stabilize the economy 
which is the key objectives of tax systems. 
The relatively wider tax gaps and lower revenue productivity of developing and emerging 
economies that contribute to galloping budget gaps can be reduced if implemented tax 
reforms incorporate effective tax compliance strategies to help raise more tax revenue 
(Odero, Reeves and Kipyego, 2015). However, the link between these tax compliance 
strategies and the level of tax revenue has not been established in Kenya. This is the 
knowledge gap that this study attempts to fill. 
1.4   Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 The Broad Objective 
The broad objective of the study was to establish the effects of tax compliance strategies 
on the level of tax revenue in Kenya. 
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1.4.2   Specific Objectives 
The broad objective is broken down into the following specific objectives: 
i. To establish the effect of taxpayer education expenditure on the level of tax 
revenue in Kenya, 
ii. To establish the effect of law enforcement expenditure on the level of tax 
revenue in Kenya, 
iii. To determine the effect of technology adoption expenditure on the level of tax 
revenue in Kenya, 
iv. To determine the effect of taxpayer services expenditure on the level of tax 
revenue in Kenya. 
1.5   Research Questions 
The study was guided by the following research questions: 
i. What is the effect of taxpayer education expenditure on the level of tax revenue in 
Kenya? 
ii. What is the effect of law enforcement expenditure on the level of tax revenue in 
Kenya? 
iii. What is the effect of technology adoption expenditure on the level of tax revenue 
in Kenya? 
iv. What is the effect of taxpayer services expenditure on the level of tax revenue in 
Kenya? 
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1.6   Scope of Study 
The study was based on country wide data covering the period between 1980 and 2015 
and was to focus on the effect tax compliance strategies expenditure on revenue 
performance in Kenya.  
1.7 Justification of the Study 
The Kenyan government and the tax agency have always put in place systems and 
arrangements to guarantee realization of higher tax revenue through enhanced tax 
compliance. This has been through efforts such as: provision of tax payer education, law 
enforcement, adoption of technology and improved tax payer services. This study aims to 
ascertain the existing link between this efforts and level of tax revenue. 
1.8   Significance of the Study 
The recommendations of the study will be of great assistance to the government and tax 
payers. The government of Kenya will be able to know the factors which can influence 
voluntary tax compliance and establish ways of implementing taxpayer friendly strategies 
so as to enhance tax collection. The tax payers in the country will appreciate the need to 
voluntarily comply and meet their tax obligations to avoid penalties and enhance their 
government's ability to meet its civic obligations. The government will also be able to 
establish ways of promoting voluntary tax compliance among its citizens and thus reduce 
the cost of tax collection and increase the tax revenue so as to reduce the budget deficit. 
1.9   Limitations of Study 
The study envisaged situations where management of the government agencies could 
withhold information for fear of the intended motive of the inquiry. However, the 
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researcher endeavored to fully explain the purpose of the investigation to anyone who 
had reservations.  
1.10 Operational Definition of Terms 
Tax Compliance: This refers to adherence to the administrative rules of lodging and 
paying taxes on time. This includes compliance with the reporting requirements, 
procedural rules and regulations. This entails filing tax returns on time, reporting all the 
income and claiming the right deductions and where taxes  are due making tax payments 
on time.  
Tax Rates: Tax rates refer to the rate at which a business or person is taxed on income. It 
also refers to the rate of tax on goods and services.  
Tax Audits: This is the activity carried out by any revenue agency to establish if the true 
value of tax liability has been paid by the tax paying entity.  
Tax Revenue: yearly revenue collected by the tax agency from persons or entities on 
whom tax levies are imposed. 
 Fines and Penalties: A fine or penalty is a levy imposed on an individual for failing to 
willingly honor his or her obligations as per the tax regulations.  
Tax incentives: A tax incentive is a benefit meant to entice and encourage voluntary 
compliance by taxpayers with aim of boosting levels of tax revenue to be realized.  
Tax evasion: Are the illegal and intentional actions taken by individuals to avoid 
adherence to their tax liability obligations. This involves: underreporting, falsification of     
documents, failing to totally submit tax returns among other efforts meant to deny the tax 
authority the power to determine the   true tax burden for the entity. 
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Tax incentives: A tax incentive is an aspect of the tax code designed to incentivize, or 
encourage a certain type of behavior.  
Residential Estate: Refers to land plus anything permanently fixed to it, including 
buildings, sheds and other items attached to the structure.  
Tax avoidance: Refers to the legally recognized reduction in tax liabilities by practices 
that take the full advantage of the tax code, such as income splitting and postponement of 
taxes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical literature review and the empirical review of the 
study variables. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
Despite the fact that taxation is used to enhance equity in the distribution on national 
resources, in Kenya, it is mainly used to facilitate the sharing function and also to ensure 
economic stability. Karingi et al., (2005: 27) argues that Kenya as an economy has 
gradually grown from a small tax producing economy in the 1980s. During this period, 
the annual aggregate tax income expressed as a ratio of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) which is financially considered as an indicator of the strength of the economy, 
ranged at 19.7% to the prevailing rate of approximately 24%. This growth has been 
achieved because of a series of economic reforms popularly termed as the Tax 
Modernization Programme (TMP) beginning the 1994/95 fiscal years to the present. The 
taxable capacity index between the financial years 1991/92 - 2010/11 has followed a 
uniform trend of increase, in real terms (GOK, 2011). 
With regard to the county structure, the Constitution permits for the enactment of a 
Revenue Fund for every devolved unit of governance, ‟  this fund shall receive all tax 
payments or moneys generated by or on behalf of the lower government levels, excluding 
any other receipts exceptionally excluded through parliamentary legislation" (Okello, 
2001:13). Expenditures of this reserves or resources for the county governments can only 
be through authorization by the county assembly legislation. However, this must get 
approval by controller of the national budget. Additionally, the central government is 
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mandated to levy income tax, value added tax, excise duties and any other charges on 
external trade and internal trade dealings (GOK, 2011). 
ITEP (2011) in its extensive contributions suggests that in each fiscal period, more than 
15% of all revenue raised by the central government should be distributed to the devolved 
units of governance. This recommendation is strengthened by the implementation of the 
new 2010 constitution. Presently, the national income stands at Kshs1.5 trillion ($17.65 
billion), implying that share to the county governments is approximately projected to be 
around Kshs 203 billion ($2.4 billion). To achieve this objective, a formula for 
distributing this revenue has been developed by the Commission on Revenue Allocation 
(CRA) and which has received approval by the national assembly. According to this 
arrangement, county governments are assigned 45 percent of this revenue on the basis on 
their population, 20 % on the basis of the prevailing poverty index and 8 per cent on 
geographical size (CRA, 2011). Additionally, all devolved government units uniformly 
receive a share of 25 % of the total national income. Marginalized or disadvantaged 
county governments benefit from an equalization kitty, which aims to accelerate their 
level of economic growth and development as a strategy to keep a breast with the other 
counties (ITEP, 2011). Given this analysis, the central government, therefore, has a 
responsibility to ensure that tax compliance is sufficient to enhance optimal tax revenue 
2.2.1   Economic Deterrence Theory 
The proponents of the economic deterrence theory argue that a taxpayer's behaviour is 
determined by factors that include the rate of tax, anticipated benefits of avoidance to 
honor tax obligations and the possibility of discovery and associated penalties for evasion 
attract punitive costs (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Becker 1968). The implication of 
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this is that if discovery is possible and punitive measures are extreme, a small percentage 
of a given tax paying population will be willing to avoid honoring their obligations. In the 
Contrary to this position, if tax audit possibilities are low and attributed fines are weak, 
the projected rate of voluntary tax evasion will be quite high. This model therefore 
predicts considerable nonconformity with the tax requirements. Even though, this 
formulation has been questioned for extensively advocating for  the coercive motivation 
to adherence, instead of the standard norm of consensus (Sandmo 2005) there exist 
sufficient prove to back the significance of the deterrence approaches as a remedy to low 
levels of compliance (McKerchar & Evans 2009). For instance, the dread of being 
apprehended, or the possibility of discovery, has occasionally been proved in some 
situations to be an efficient approach to trigger truthful behaviour. Additionally, this 
philosophy is founded on the idea that, deterrence from voluntarily engaging in a wrong 
will be accelerated once an individual realizes that net penalty of committing a crime 
overshadows the attributed positive reward of the crime itself. This assumption is based 
on the notion that each tax payer is well informed of the dissimilarity between just and 
unjust plus the penalties related to wrong or criminal behaviour. The founders of the 
economic deterrence model assert that individuals willingly decide to observe or go 
against the regulations considering the anticipated benefits and disbenefits of their 
actions. 
Fines and penalty rates may substitute each other due to their multiplicative linkages as 
long as neither of them is set to zero (Kirchler et al 2007). Higher fines simply make 
evading taxes more hazardous for taxpayers and should deter them from evasion. 
Empirically, the deterrent effect of fines could not always be supported. The observed 
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effects were weaker than expected and some studies even suggest that an increase of 
penalties can have undesirable effect and result in more tax avoidance (Kirchler et al, 
(2007). Alma et al., (2012) supports the evidence that fines do affect tax compliance 
though the impact was virtually zero. Friedland et al., (2008) compliance was strongly 
affected by the amount of fines than by audit probabilities. Several studies however found 
no support for the deterring effects of fines since it was weak (Andreoni, 2008). Some of 
the findings suggest that a policy based on deterrence is effective only in combination 
with frequent Audits (Kirchler et al., 2007). 
Another argument to investigate these compliance costs is that high tax rates and 
complex tax legislations can induce fraud. Earlier research (Franzoni, 2008) concluded 
that companies will create a kind of resentment against authorities who impose too high 
levies and too complex tax systems. This will incentivize (illegal) tax avoiding systems 
because of the high financial advantages and the low condemnation rates (Franzoni, 
1998). In addition, because of the complexity of the system, the companies often need to 
rely on external tax professionals who by means of sophisticated tax avoidance 
engineering will minimize tax payments (Franzoni, 2008). Finally, the general 
introduction of the VAT regime in almost all countries has raised interest in identifying 
and quantifying the impact of the new system on tax compliance costs (Evans, 2003). 
Acknowledging the fact that high compliance costs diminish competitiveness of the 
country in terms of taxation attractiveness, public services have become increasingly 
interested in ways to simplify their tax legislation systems.  
The Deterrence formulation, one of the models based on economic principles, was 
developed by Allingham and Sandom (2012) who improved on the anticipated value 
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model of unlawful action advanced by Becker (2008) to the taxation concept. This school 
of thought integrates the understanding of an economically normal taxpayer who will 
voluntarily avoid paying tax as long as the expected returns from non-compliance are 
higher to the anticipated consequence of getting apprehended. Allingham and Sandom 
(2012) suggested an important economic deterrence concept on the basis of the expected 
utility function of the individual who avoids paying taxes. This formulation integrates a 
number of features. To start with, the taxpayer experiences some degree of risk distaste, 
the greater risk averse the tax paying agent is, and the lesser likelihood that he/she 
voluntarily avoids to pay his or her tax obligations.  
Secondly, the tax paying agent requires to have an understanding about the taxation 
regime to calculate the possibility of being discovered and the magnitude of the costs 
likely to be in the defaulting is detected. According to this arrangement, the taxpayer 
chooses the aggregate of taxes to submit to the tax management authority. In the process 
of this determination, the tax paying agent aims to optimize anticipated value which 
refers to the aggregate of the utility value of each outcome weighted by the probability 
that the particular result occurs. The formulation confirms that when the level of 
detection is significant, the tendency to underreport is deterred and that greater rates of 
the comparative tax gives way to minimum levels of reported revenue. The overall 
assumption of the economic deterrence theory is that adherence to tax laws relies 
fundamentally on tax audit and penalty. Implications of this assertion are that taxpayers 
will honor their tax obligations because of the fear of sanctions. To conclude, the 
theoretical ideologies of monetary restriction have also been extensively accepted by tax 
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managements in the process of formulating implementation plans that are fundamentally 
based on punishments and the fear of getting detected and apprehended. 
2.2.2 Fiscal Exchange Theory. 
 The proponents of the fiscal exchange theory assert that the occurrence of expenditures 
by the government a recipe to encourage greater adherence to tax obligations and that 
state can enhance voluntary submission by availing amenities that people favor in a 
highly effective and manageable fashion (Cowell and Gordon 1988; Levi 1988; Tilly 
1992; Moore 2004; 1998). Alm et al., (1992) noted that tax compliance rises with 
(perceptions of) the abundance of goods and services of public interest. Accordingly, 
taxpayers majorly look at the direct benefit for using their resources to pay tax; this may 
be through provision of public goods and services (quid pro quo). This model interprets 
the process of taxation and the provision of goods and services of public interest in the 
form of a contractual connection that binds the government through its tax management 
authority and the tax paying agents (Moore 2004). Citizens of a country and 
organizations may voluntarily honor their tax obligations because they appreciate the 
benefits of the amenities availed by the state, they recognize that their tax remittances are 
significant by either helping to fund provision of public utilities that include goods and 
services or by motivating other citizens to voluntarily participate in tax payment 
(Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001). The anticipated progressive rewards or incentives are 
likely to enhance the possibility of voluntary compliance by the taxpayers; this will be 
with minimal or zero coercion. Irrespective of the fact that a number of taxpayers may 
not be able to determine the actual benefit of the provisions by the government as 
rewards for their tax payment commitment, it is possible to be able to argue that 
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taxpayers elicit overall impressions and feelings with respect to their own and others' 
improved conditions of exchange with their state (Richupan1987). Therefore, it is 
significant to have a general assumption that taxpayer attitude towards tax compliance is 
influenced by his/her fulfillment or failure to achieve fulfillment with regard to his/her 
conditions of interaction with the state. Finally, when the regime of taxation is seen as 
being unfair and unjust, fraud may, at least partly, be viewed as a concerted effort by the 
tax paying agent to alter his conditions or preference to transact with the government. 
This fiscal exchange principle has attracted great interest as a center of focus and is 
satisfactorily developed theoretically. Empirical prove necessary to authenticate the 
theory is, however, unclear (D'Arcy 2011: 5‐6). 
 
In conclusion, this model proposes that, attitudes of the members of any civilization are 
always influenced by existence of fixed elements that bear their origin from particular 
environments and stream from a well-established and structured manner. The tendency to 
fulfill a certain behavior will always depend on the fact that the individual has a purpose 
towards that behavior (behavioral intention).This intention or objective on its part is 
dependent upon on three fundamental conditions: the attitude of the individual towards 
the behavior, subjective values and perceived behavioral control. The three elements too 
are said to be influenced by behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs and control beliefs. The 
fiscal exchange model thus, bases its subject matter on the morals, beliefs and ethical 
inclinations of the taxpayer. Accordingly, this theory asserts that an individual intending 
to pay taxes may voluntarily comply even when the possibility by the tax authority to 
detect is low. On the contrast, economic theories put extreme emphasis on enhanced 
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audits and punishments as alternatives to non-compliance, the fiscal exchange models 
greatly focus in altering tax payer perceptions and attitudes with regard to a tax regime.  
2.2.3   Regulatory Compliance Theory. 
Erick (2007) believes that individuals who have advanced compliance theories often 
perceive compliance as "planned" and not as an "automatic", response. In an attempt to 
concur with the Weberian approach to describing behaviour, compliance proponents 
regard goal-oriented responses as approximate indications of satisfaction for realistic 
response processes. This assumption has merited a number of intuitive analyses. To date, 
important concerns are unexplained, consequently, this has had a limiting effect on the 
uninterrupted growth of the compliance model. Two of them call for attention (Valeria, 
2004). 
To start with, the compliance theory needs to provide justification for the empirically 
established behavior of the tax controllers to institute concurrently numerous, 
heterogeneous targets (Jayapalan, 2003). Empirical studies confirm the possibility of 
having a combination of physical, psychological and normative targets taking effect on 
compliance and noncompliance tendencies. In particular, a regulatee  could be focusing 
on enhancing his profitability, safeguard self from any anticipated loss, derive pleasure, 
and respond in an appropriate manner, all at once (Karingi et al., 2005). However, 
Machogu and Amayi (2013) believe that the said targets may not necessarily translate 
into a generally accepted standard for utility. Therefore, the theories advocating for 
voluntary compliance rely only on one kind of these motives, particularly the rational 
actor theories of compliance, assume and fail to account for a substantial portion of the 
empirical certainty, the way a number of experimental studies have concluded.  
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Numerous concepts have been suggested as explanations to this fundamental problem, 
although a greater percentage of this propositions have turned out to be inadequate. The 
popular and significant contribution by the proponents of the compliance theories is the 
suggestion to combine varied formulations of response. If considered separately, each of 
these models puts aside the intricacy of purposes noticeable in convincing situations. 
However, when considered collectively, the models are able to convincingly provide 
explanations for almost all the interpretations, based on the assumption that the actors 
who constitute compliers and non-compliers can be categorized for instance as: 
"utilitarians” "unprincipled calculators" "bad apples" and or "opportunists". Alternatively, 
they could be the dutiful "virtuous" actors, citizens, or good apples. The popular 
illustrations are the assertions of Machogu et al., (2013).  It combines two conflicting 
theories: rational choice theory (game theory) and the perception that norm 
internalization in mutual exchanges is likely to overshadow opportunistic attractions of 
failure to comply. Therefore, this is generally considered a compromising position 
between the logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness as representation of the 
many developments to the regulation literature. 
 
2.2.4 Fiscal Psychology Theory   
This theory of tax compliance assumes that psychological factors including moral and 
ethical concerns are also important to taxpayers. Among these theories is the Theory of 
Planned Behavior which was developed by Ajzen in 2011.  
32 
 
This theory is a successor to the Theory of Reasoned Action of Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2005), Ajzen and Fishbein (2000) and Ajzen (2008).This theory tries to explain human 
behavior. 
According to this theory, behaviors of the individuals within the society are under the 
influence of definite factors, originate from certain reasons and emerge in a planned way. 
The ability to perform a particular behavior depends on the fact that the individual has a 
purpose towards that behavior (behavioral intention). Behavioral intention in turn 
depends on three factors that is Attitude towards the behavior, Subjective norms and 
Perceived behavioral control. These three factors are also under the influence of 
behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs and control beliefs. The focus of this theory 
therefore is on the taxpayer‟s morals and ethics. The theory suggests that a taxpayer may 
comply even when the probability of detection is low. As opposed to the economic 
theories that emphasize on increased audits and penalties as solutions to compliance 
issues, psychological theories lay emphasis on changing individual attitudes towards tax 
systems.  
2.3   Tax Compliance. 
It is a requirement that all tax management authorities focus their attention on attainment 
optimum compliance. This implies that overall adherence to taxation laws and regulations 
should be maximum. To achieve this, authorities have allocated a substantial amount of 
resources, consequently, a lot of caution should be taken when making decisions on the 
mode and through which the assigned resources will be used to realize the most superior 
result as far as enhanced compliance with the revenue collection rules are concerned. One 
of the major issues that has a close relationship with compliance to the tax requirements, 
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is the fundamental question of determining the priorities for adherence response and the 
particular activities to be undertaken (Jamel and Michael, 2001). The main objective and 
concern of any tax administration, is raise the taxes and other levies expected to be paid 
with regard with established policy and carry out this process in a way that is bound to 
develop and nurture sustainable trust in the tax regime and its management. Adherence to 
tax obligations is a critical issue to many tax agents. To persuade taxpayers to conform to 
the tax regulations is also another demanding task that is not easy to achieve owing to the 
fact that tax laws are complex, rigid and never precise‟  (James and Alley, 2004).The 
concept of compliance to taxation requirements in the simplest form possible is often 
perceived in terms of the extent to which tax paying agents conform with the taxation 
rules (James, 1999).However, in concurrence with other similar concepts, compliance is 
always considered to have a range of explanations. One particular dimension fronted and 
popularly accepted is that the extent of failure to comply may be determined in relation to 
the „tax gap‟ . This describes the deviation between the actual tax income raised and the 
levels projected to be raised if conformity to tax regulations were 100% (James, 1999).  
Tax compliance is a major problem for many tax authorities and it is not easy task to 
persuade taxpayers to comply with tax requirements even though tax laws are not always 
precise‟  (James and Alley, 2004).The definition of tax compliance in its most simple 
form is usually cast in terms of the degree to which taxpayers comply with the tax law, 
(James and Alley, 2004).  However, like many such concepts, the meaning of compliance 
can be seen as a continuum of definitions. One suggestion is that the degree of non-
compliance may be measured in terms of the „tax gap‟ . Tax gap represents the 
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difference between the actual revenue collected and the amount that would be collected if 
there was 100% compliance  
Allingham and Sandmo (2012) described tax compliance as an issue of reporting an 
actual income and also claimed that compliance behavior was influenced by a situation 
whereby taxpayers have to make a decision under uncertainty i.e. either taxpayers would 
enjoy tax savings due to under reporting income or have to pay on the undeclared amount 
at a penalty rate which is higher than they would have paid had the income been fully 
declared at the correct time.  
Allingham and Sandmo (2012), and Andreoni et al., (2008) characterize and explain tax 
compliance as the output of interrelation among variables including perception of equity, 
efficiency and incidence (public finance views). Tax enforcement aspects like penalties 
and the probability of detection also relate to tax compliance while other labor market 
behavior factors including an individual‟s wages and tax bracket also contribute to tax 
compliance (Kirchler, 2007).  
According to Masinde and Makau (2010), taxes play an important role in the budget of 
any economy and one of the main reasons why the government imposes taxes is to 
generate income to manage the economy and redistribute resources. Over the years, the 
Kenya government has undertaken various revenue administration reforms aimed at 
enhancing revenue collection. One of the measures that have been implemented in order 
to increase revenue collection in Kenya was the introduction of self-assessment systems 
(SAS) in 1992. The objectives of this system was to increase voluntary compliance, 
reduce tax authorities‟  burden of assessing tax returns and increase tax collection 
efficiency (reduce tax collection costs) (Masinde et al., 2010). However despite various 
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administrative reforms, levels of tax compliance have remained quite low. A survey 
conducted by KRA, KIPPRA and the Treasury, based on 1999/2000 data revealed that 
VAT payment compliance was as low as 55% while return lodgment compliance was 
65% (Makau et al., 2010). 
Nicoleta (2011) in his study says that tax noncompliance is a substantive universal 
phenomenon that transcends cultural and political boundaries and takes place in all 
societies and economic systems. There are many studies that explain the behavior of tax 
compliance in a more realistic situation. They focus on the determinants of tax 
compliance, respectively on economic and non-economic factors. Tax non-compliance is 
an area of concern for all government and tax authorities, and it continues to be an 
important issue that must be addressed. Regardless of time and place, the main issue 
faced by all tax authorities is that it has never been easy to persuade all taxpayers to 
comply with the regulations of a tax system. In contrast to the majority of employed 
people - who in many countries are paid net salaries with taxes being deducted at source 
–residential estate investors often need to self-assess and self-report their income and pay 
taxes "out of their pocket." Residential estate investors not only pay their income tax but 
need to take account of various types of business taxes such as corporate tax, property 
taxes, and payroll taxes; they need to collect sales taxes such as VAT; and they need to 
withhold taxes such as personal income taxes in the case of having at least one employee 
(Christensen et al., 2001).  
Jackson (2013) believes that to improve and sustain a significant level of tax compliance, 
demands focus on long-run tax reform initiatives. To achieve this, authorities may be 
required to start with reinforcing the structure and management of the tax collection 
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agency, developing and applying dynamic collection procedures (e.g., remittance and 
withholding procedures) and also reinforcing the  ability of the essential tax management 
functions (registration, filing and payment enforcement, debt collection, audit, taxpayer 
services, and processing of appeals). Keen et al., (2013) assert that change of the legal 
infrastructure and judicial processes is also considered essential in ensuring that the 
required controls, penalty systems, and procedures adopted to settle any emerging 
differences should be in place. It is fundamental to note that advancement in technology 
and investment in sophisticated communication systems, is  playing a crucial role in tax 
conformance administration .For instance,  automatic collecting of third-party data as a 
by-product of natural transactional processes; application of electronic bills to enhance 
in-time transaction monitoring and verification; and evaluation of uncertainties related to 
tax revenue). 
Prioritizing reforms in tax management and administration as a precondition to realize 
improved levels of tax compliance vary from one country to another and from one 
economic region to another, showing dissimilarities in stages of achievement, managerial 
ability, and the possibility of tax abuse. The assumption that “One size does not fit all”, 
requires that any changes in tax arrangements should to be tailored to each and every 
economic region‟s prevailing conditions. The significantly growing tax gaps and reduced 
income generation of third world economies and other emerging economies indicate great 
potential for increased revenue productivity if tax conformity initiatives are enhanced. 
For these countries, getting the fundamentals of tax administration in place (especially 
taxpayer service operations and efficient audit and enforcement) should be the first step 
(Machogu & Amayi, 2013). According to the Tax Justice Network Africa, (2011), a 
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conformance program for taxpayers is an advanced strategy that consolidates in one 
document an explanation of the most essential uncertainties relate to conformity to tax 
requirements which are recognized in the tax regime and lays out a detailed plan of how 
the tax authority anticipates to tackle these risks. It does not attempt to cover every aspect 
of a tax agency's operational activities. Programs to enhance taxpayer compliance are 
ordinarily developed with regard to stratification of the taxpayers based on their tax 
capacity and general tendency to comply. These segments could be large enterprise, 
average level firms, small and micro businesses, and individuals. The established 
programs are also tailored to mitigate compliance threats related to each specific section 
of the taxable population (Spitzer, 2003). 
Studies by Nicoleta (2011) affirm that nonconformity to tax requirements is an essentially 
common occurrence which cuts across social and regional boundaries and manifests itself 
in all social backgrounds and economic establishments. A number of studies have been 
put forward that vividly attempt to explain the dynamics of adherence to tax obligations 
in an extensively and practical manner. This studies generally relate to the causes of tax 
compliance particularly emphasis is on economic and non-economic elements. Incidences 
of failure to pay taxes has gradually grown and become an area of great interest for most 
economic establishments, political governments and tax agencies. This economic menace 
is perpetually becoming a central problem that needs to be sorted out if the desire to raise 
and sustain substantial tax revenue is to be achieved. Irrespective of time and place, the 
major challenge that confronts significantly all tax authorities is the perennial difficulty 
of attempting to convince and eventually influence taxpayers to adhere to the 
requirements of a tax regime. As opposed to a great number of salaried persons who in 
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most countries receive their salaries after imposed taxes have been remitted directly by 
their employers, private business owners more often require personally assess and 
individually declare their revenue and remit taxes "from of their pocket." Business 
owners not only submit their personal income taxes but also need to consider and account 
for the other numerous classes of business levies like corporate tax, material levies, and 
payroll fees etc. They also must to collect sales taxes such as VAT; and they need to 
withhold taxes such as personal income taxes in the case of having at least one employee 
(Christensen et al., 2001).  
Although passing strong and relevant laws is considered a milestone in quest to achieve 
significant tax compliance results as is the expectation of many tax management 
authorities, it is nonetheless an expensive reaction to any specified incidence of non-
compliance. Consequently, emphasis of the external legislative context signifies an 
incidence of concerted effort by the authorities to examine the current pieces of law as a 
precondition to detect loopholes and dangers that may require to be solved or dealt with 
significantly by administrative procedures. The duty of the tax authority is to act as per 
the dictates of established rule of law. While recommending changes to legislation does 
represent a legitimate compliance approach for revenue authorities, this guidance note 
concentrates on administrative rather than legislative solutions (Tanzi & Zee, 2000).  
Tax management systems all over the globe function within the jurisdiction of their 
political and social environments. Time and again, political establishments or sovereign 
states will often put commitments upon tax agencies that might not have otherwise 
represented a compliance risk worthy of regulatory intervention. These supplementary 
conditions however constitute a greater portion of the environment under which the tax 
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regime need significantly work and signify a very fundamental impost on revenue 
distribution and expenditure that has to be substantially regulated. Public opinion 
represents an important consideration for revenue authorities. The context upon which 
administrative authority is exercised within the society presents a one on one effect not 
only on the public behavior with regard to tax compliance but rather upon the capacity of 
the income management authority to effectively manage the system of taxation and upon 
the attitude of the revenue authority employees (Tax Justice Network Africa, 2011). 
Spitzer (2003) noted that in an environment with finite productive resources, the method 
through which a conformity threat will be managed should significantly be taken into 
account. This is not only because of the need to spread resources to achieve a balanced 
programme of compliance activity but also to ensure that the manner of treatment is 
acceptable to community standards. It is recommended that price for adherence to the tax 
regulations incurred by the society should be proportionate to the anticipated degree of 
compliance threat experience if a nation is to have the ability necessary to measure to its 
general goals of projecting and raising the income in a way that will promote and 
maintain significant levels of confidence by the community. Societal principles and the 
possible influence of tax compliance responsibilities are fundamental characteristics of 
the functioning environment that the management of any country should appreciate to 
design and implement an efficient compliance treatment process. 
2.3.1   Tax Payer Education 
The effort by tax authorities and the state in general to educate taxpayers is among the 
commonly applied initiatives meant to enhance delivery of services to the taxpayers. It 
believed that making service delivery better is crucial to promote voluntary compliance to 
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tax requirements. Absence of willingness to comply with tax obligations induces income 
authorities to employ expensive and punitive approaches to enforce tax (Fjeldstad and 
Ranker, 2003). Therefore, education for taxpayers is a vital instrument formulated to 
make it possible and easy for the taxpayers to significantly comprehend the rules and 
regulations of taxation and processes. It concerns with training of specialized components 
within the income departments, provision of education, counselling and supporting of the 
tax paying agents. This is carried out through various forms of media that may include 
newspapers, televised programs, radio programs, websites, workshops, and customer care 
desks to help fundamentally distribute crucial information to the taxpayers (Siti, Normala 
& Sheik, 2007). 
The influence of knowledge on compliance behaviors has been assessed in various 
researches. Knowledge as one of the factors in compliance is related to the taxpayers' 
ability to understand taxation laws, and their willingness to comply. The aspect of 
knowledge that relates to compliance is the general understanding about taxation 
regulations and information pertaining to the opportunity to evade tax (Kasipillai, 
Norhani and Noor, 2003). Taxation knowledge is necessary to increase public awareness 
especially in areas concerning taxation laws, the role of tax in national development, and 
especially to explain how and where the money collected is spent by the government 
(Mohd, 2010). Attitude towards tax compliance can be improved through the 
enhancement of taxation knowledge. When a taxpayer has a positive attitude towards tax, 
this will reduce his or her inclination to evade tax payment (Eriksen & Fallan, 2006). Self 
assessment system (SAS) requires taxpayers to understand all the laws and regulations 
that govern taxation. This is necessary because taxpayers will have to calculate 
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themselves the amount of tax they need to pay and make the payment (Kasipillai, 2003). 
Taxpayers will readily accept any new system introduced, like the SAS, if they have 
ample knowledge to understand the system. Thus, education programs organized by the 
tax authority or other public education institutions are needed to enhance taxpayers' 
ability to understand Self assessment system and to increase their confidence in fulfilling 
their responsibilities as taxpayers (Mohani, 2001).  
 
Greater education is directly linked to a likelihood of compliance. Educated taxpayers 
may be aware of non compliance opportunities, but their potentially better understanding 
of the tax system and their higher level of moral development promotes a more favorable 
taxpayer attitude and therefore greater compliance (Chan et. al. 2000). Chan et al., (2000) 
also suggested that those with a higher education level are more likely to have a higher 
level of moral development and higher level attitudes toward compliance and thus will 
tend to comply more. One of the measures to increase voluntary compliance is by 
assuring that taxpayers have a certain level of qualifications, ability and confidence to 
exercise their tax responsibility (Mohani, 2001). Taxpayers who have attended a tax 
course would be expected to have better tax knowledge and tax compliance attitude in 
comparison with taxpayers who have never attended a tax course (Mohad, 2010). Further, 
the study highlighted that tax authority need to emphasize teaching tax courses because 
of impact of education on compliance.  
 
From the tax administration viewpoint, researchers have concluded that compliance could 
be influenced by educating taxpayers of their social responsibilities to pay and thus their 
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intention would be to comply. As a behavior problem, tax compliance depends on the 
cooperation of the public. There are greater gains in assisting compliant taxpayers meet 
their fiscal obligations rather than spending more resources pursuing the minority of no-
compliers. Assisting tax payers by improving the flow and quality of information or 
education them (e.g., TV campaigns) in to becoming more responsible citizens has the 
potential to yield greater revenue than if it were spent on enforcement activities. A 
theoretical economic model introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (2012) has clearly 
indicated that penalties as well as audit probability have an impact on tax compliance. 
The higher the penalty and the potential audit probability the greater discouragement for 
potential tax evasion.  
Failure to comply could sometimes be involuntary, meaning that the concerned taxpayer 
is particularly ignorant of his/her tax responsibilities or totally fails to carry out his/her 
tax obligations a result of not understanding the established laws of taxation and 
processes. Non-compliance may also be voluntary, where the potential taxpayer fails to 
promptly pay his or her tax levies because of compliance attitudes. It is believed that this 
initiative of enlightening taxpayers will enable them to adequately be familiar with the 
tax rules, procedures and associated processes and cultivate a friendly environment that 
will trigger greater tax conformity to the tax procedures (Normala, 2007). The revenue 
collection authorities have particularly prioritized giving special focus to the SMEs, by 
making procedures for tax laws simple, associations, initiating yearly taxpayer 
recognition day, and enhancing integrity in taxation, among the strategies (Kimungu and 
Kileva, 2007). Tax awareness is more significant when consideration is given to the 
objective of generating tax income in a more dynamic environment, predominantly from 
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the official tax evaluation perspective (Machogu and Amayi, 2013). Similarly, to achieve 
compliance to tax obligations and to improve on raising tax income is generally an 
overwhelming task (Kimungu and Kileva, 2007). However, this challenge reduced to 
minimal levels when a well structure program of tax education is put place. The 
important objective of common programs of   education is geared towards the change of 
taxpayer attitude. This being the case, analytical theories of behavioural change and 
learning theories can best explain how education can change the behaviour of an 
individual (Erich, 2007).  
Change theory is commonly applied to explain change of taxpayer behaviour, this 
believes that in the unlikely event that challenge relating to attitude prevails, there exist 
be adaptable elements contributing to the challenge. Examples of the adaptable elements 
include awareness, beliefs, intents, relational support, administrative and other 
environmental circumstances. The model believes that education is essential to facilitate 
change in the adaptable elements, and education for a taxpayer is meant to particularly to 
improve this attitude. This is achieved by changing the attitude of a taxpayer by 
influencing the manner in which he or she arrives at decision making (Gardiner, 2001). 
Education is believed to have a substantial progressive effect on the behavioural change 
of an individual. Ideally, a number of studies conducted with special emphasis to tax 
compliance, as pointed out in the empirical literature have put more emphasis on 
strategies aimed to achieve change of the taxpayer attitude in order to become more 
compliant with tax management regulations and procedures. Strategies including audits, 
preventive actions of penalties and fines together with implementation of quality service 
delivery mechanisms an greatly enhance tax revenues. A handful of studies have put 
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more effort on how tax compliance behaviour is affected by one individual factor holding 
constant other influencing factors. The results from such studies indicate that there is a 
significant positive relationship between taxpayer education and the level of tax 
compliance (Kassipillai, 2003). Taxpayer education provides the necessary tax 
knowledge to comply with the tax matter and change the perceptions and attitudes 
towards tax compliance by creating more positive attitudes. 
Various researchers have assessed the influence of knowledge on compliance behaviour. 
The aspect of education being a major factor substantially related to tax compliance 
influences the taxpayer‟s capability to perfectly comprehend laws governing the 
processes and procedures of taxation, and their willingness to comply. The concept of 
knowledge that greatly concerns itself with adherence to tax requirements is the overall 
awareness of the taxation rules and any know-how regarding the possibility of loopholes 
that can permit tax evasion (Kasipillai, Norhani and Noor, 2003). The know-how on 
Taxation is essential to boost the general public consciousness particularly in aspects that 
are concerned with rules and regulations for taxation, the core function of tax in the 
development of a country, and specifically to describe the mode and structure of 
expenditure of the revenue raised by the government (Mohd, 2010). Advancement in the 
levels of tax education has the possibility of accelerating the change of taxpayer attitude 
and make it easier and convenient for adherence to the regulations. If the general feeling 
of a tax paying agent towards compliance is positive, inclination to non-conformance 
drastically falls to the minimum. (Eriksen & Fallan, 2006). Self-assessment system (SAS) 
demands that taxpayers have an understanding of all the rules and procedures that control 
the management of the taxation system. This will be indispensable to the taxpayers 
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because it will enable them to individually determine their tax liability and make 
necessary arrangements to pay with the highest degree of convenience. (Kasipillai, 2003). 
Potential taxpayers will be ready to accommodate new systems that are brought on board, 
such as the SAS, only when they have adequate information that will facilitate their 
understanding of the system. Therefore, training modalities developed by the tax agency 
or any other public institutions of learning are required to promote the ability of the 
taxpayer to have an understanding of self-assessment systems and to boost their trust in 
performing their obligations as taxpayers (Mohani, 2001).  
Higher level of tax education is directly associated with increased possibility of 
compliance. Informed taxpayers will always be in a position to detect incidences that may 
trigger non-compliance. The potentially higher level of know-how regarding the tax 
regime and that tax payer‟s greater degree of ethical growth is a recipe for promoting a 
more progressive taxpayer behavior and consequently lead to lower non-compliance 
(Chan et. al. 2000). In his recommendations suggested that individuals with enhanced 
educational background are highly likely to exhibit greater level of ethical maturity and 
higher level attitudes toward compliance and thus will tend to comply more. One of the 
measures to increase voluntary compliance is by assuring that taxpayers have a certain 
level of qualifications, ability and confidence to exercise their tax responsibility (Mohani, 
2001). Taxpayers who have attended a tax course would be expected to have better tax 
knowledge and tax compliance attitude in comparison with taxpayers who have never 
participated in a tax course (Mohd, 2010). Hite and Hasseldine (2001) highlighted that 
tax authority needs to emphasize teaching tax courses because of the impact of education 
on compliance.  
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2.3.2   Improved Taxpayer Services. 
Mikessel (2013) proposes that the fundamental objective for any revenue authority is to 
have an effectively and efficiently program of program of taxpayer services .The 
generally complicated guidelines for tax payment together with the vast and raising 
numbers of potential taxpayers to be taken care of by a taxation program  requires that all 
revenue authorities should depend considerably on taxpayers' tendency to voluntarily 
comply in order to realize and even surpass the tax level expected of them. It is clear that 
if a tax authority has to obtain optimum levels of voluntary conformance, taxpayers and 
their agents must operate within an efficient standard of services to enable understand 
that it is their duty according to the law to follow the regulations expected of them in the 
event of fulfilling tax payment responsibility. 
Under these concerns, income authorities preferably require a logical approach or system 
in order for them to be able to arrive at an ideal range of networks for service provision, 
the one that obtains greater levels of efficiency and at the same time also meets its 
productivity aims from both the perspectives of the income management authority and 
the taxpayer at large. The expression "channel strategy" has been devised under the 
sophisticated present business language to explain such a framework of operation. A 
channel strategy influences to a large extent the organizational arrangements that include 
the technical and physical infrastructure, the entire service provision channels, services 
content, management procedures ,processes and culture. Similarly, besides the internal 
participants, there exists a body of external participants who most of the time determines 
as to whether the channel strategies should be for individual customers, businesses, 
government, tax agents or different user groups (Zodrow, 2001).  
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2.3.3 Law Enforcement. 
Credible enforcement is an integral part of any compliance strategy as it acts not only to 
deter tax evasion but also to remind taxpayers that the tax collector is working to sustain 
a fair system of tax by making it possible for every taxpayer to honor their tax liabilities 
fairly. Efficient tax management often starts with the requirements that are in practice. 
The law signifies and shapes the structure of the situation or circumstances within which 
a tax authority works and it is from this environment that we determine the uncertainties 
related to tax compliance that have a close link with the management of the tax law. The 
fundamental task for any effective revenue collection body is to manage the law in such a 
way as to ensure that overall community trust in their administration is sustained.  
Some empirical studies have shown that trust nurtures compliance. The only way to 
obtain confidence in a tax management system is to carry out its activities in a manner 
that will make it possible for all the interested parties to experience fairness. People's 
understanding of trust is closely associated with their assessment of the processes with 
which authorities operate or work (Fjeldstad and Ranker, 2003). The expression 
„procedural justice' conventionally applied to define the professed fairness of the 
processes and procedures followed in determination of decision, and also the actual 
treatment an individual gets from the authority responsible for making such a decision. It 
is established that individuals who perceive that have been subjected to fair treatment by 
an organization are highly likely to have confidence in such a system and are more likely 
to appreciate and comply with its decisions and follow its directions. The opinion held by 
majority of individuals about the fairness of an authority is largely anchored on an 
individual‟s actual experience from past happenings, other people's experiences and 
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media reports (Christina, Debonah, & Gary 2010). Allingham and Sandmo (2012) 
portrays compliance to tax as an matter of providing true information regarding level of 
revenue and also goes ahead to assert that compliance responses are largely affected  by a 
situations in which taxpayers have to make crucial tax determinations unclear 
circumstances i.e. either they may benefit from enhanced tax savings as a result of 
declaring low income levels or that they may be forced to pay on the misreported low 
revenue at a fine at a rate expected to be higher than what they would pay if they 
endeavored to truly declare their full income at the first incident.  
It is recommended that the state pursues alternative measures in its quest to improve on 
the level of tax efficiency and effectiveness (Alm et al., 1992). Therefore, the 
administration of coercive measures such as fines and other non-compliance costs should 
be encouraged to minimize further delayed payment of the tax liabilities. It therefore 
follows that tax audits by tax management agencies should be considered necessary and 
compulsory, specifically when non-compliance is detected or suspected to have been 
committed by the tax paying entity be ignorantly or intentionally. The concept non-
compliance has always been emphasized by the policy changes geared to punish, such as 
the regular tax audits and percentage fines (Alm, McClelland, Schulze, 1992). 
Unfortunately, the theoretical instrument employed could not extensively predict and 
give a comprehensive account of the taxpayer reluctant attitude and more often refusal to 
comply with tax payment. Several empirical studies to explain the complex and 
unpredictable tendency of adherence to tax regulations in more genuine circumstances 
have been carried out. These studies concerned themselves with the elements that 
influence compliance or levels of non-compliance. This could be respectively on 
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economic and non‐economic elements. Non‐financial elements, initially assumed by 
early economic proponents, are now considered in crucial in helping the understanding of 
the adherence to tax regulations through the use of an economic structure (Smith and 
Stalans, 1991). These economists have considered a number of  non‐economic 
determinants, that  range from the general willingness to honor liability for government 
provisions, general education, tax attitude, etc. (Hyun, 2005) 
From the perspective of tax management, compliance may largely be determined or 
enhanced by enlightening taxpayers and other stakeholders that it is their public duty to 
pay tax and consequently, their intentions to comply will greatly be boosted. Being a 
behavioral initiative, compliance to tax liabilities and the associated regulations, relies to 
a greater extent the overall support of the general public. Greater benefits are reaped 
when compliant taxpayers are assisted and enabled to achieve their fiscal obligations 
instead of an authority spending extra resources to pursue a smaller proportion of the 
population that fail either voluntarily or involuntarily to comply. By helping tax payers 
through improved flow and quality of information or educating them (e.g., TV 
campaigns) as a way of making them become more accountable citizens has the ability to 
trigger greater yields in terms of revenue than if it were spent on enforcement activities. 
Allingham and Sandmo (2012) developed a theoretical economic model that essentially 
proposes that fines, penalties as well as fraud detection possibilities always have a direct 
influence on taxpayer compliance. It is believed by this model that the greater and 
punitive the penalty is and the greater the possibility to detect fraud, the higher the level 
of discouragement to tax evasion behaviors. When heavy costs are imposed on any 
detected attempt to evade tax, it becomes more expensive for the errant taxpayers and has 
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a greater impact of deterring them from any future attempts of evasion. Empirically, the 
preventive impact of penalties and fines could not always be supported. The 
manifestation of this situation is the fact that the negative effects  witnessed are weaker 
than expected and some studies even assert that increased penalties may have 
disagreeable impact and may lead to greater incidences and preference by taxpayers to 
evade tax (Kirchler et al., (2007). Alm et al., (2012) in their findings and submissions 
support the position that costs of tax avoidance greatly affect tax compliance although the 
experienced impact was nearly insignificant. However, Friedland et al., (2008) proposes 
that tax compliance is highly influenced by the severity of associated costs such as fines 
and penalties than as opposed to detection possibilities. The most extreme penalties will 
have no effect, if it is common knowledge that audits virtually do not occur. The 
increasing tax avoidance and tax resistance due to an increase of fines puts into question 
how fines should be assessed to be effective. On the one hand fines should be high 
enough to decrease the expected value of tax evasion and to assure its deterrent effect on 
tax payers. On the other hand, if fines are too high, the tax system would be perceived as 
unjust and unfair and taxpayers would use any possibility to legally avoid taxes (Kirchler 
et al., 2007).A number of research findings however, have fundamentally failed to with 
the discouraging effects of fines and termed them as insignificant (Andreoni, 2008).Other 
related studies have proposed that a policy based on deterrence can only be successful if 
it is accompanied by regular and thorough  tax Audits (Kirchler et al., 2007). 
Taxpayers may technically meet their obligations, but compliance may be in question due 
to interpretational differences of the law. In such circumstances, lack of clarity of the 
taxation law represents a category of risk to be addressed either by changing the law or 
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by amending the way in which it is administered (Alligahm and Sandmo, 2004).  All 
revenue authorities are appropriated a limited level of resources, invariably well short of 
what is required to ensure full compliance from every taxpayer as tax liabilities arise. 
This means that efficient tax administration has to be about optimizing collections under 
the tax laws in ways that sustain community confidence in the tax authority and in a 
manner that demonstrates that the system is operating correctly. As a result, revenue 
authorities require a methodology for determining the most rational allocation of their 
resources. This is by no means a straightforward proposition (Machogu and Amayi, 
2013).  The objective of tax administration may be consistent with optimizing collections 
under the law and increasing the levels of voluntary compliance in ways that sustain 
community confidence, but the means to achieving it are not. Success is founded on 
innovation and cooperation in understanding the marketplace, recognizing differences 
and devising approaches accordingly (Dicleson & Hadjimanolis, 2008). 
The observations above suggest that authority should treat citizens fairly and respectfully, 
listening to them and providing clear explanations for different actions. Treatment must 
also be even-handed and consistent: the perception that one group has been dealt with 
more or less favorably than another will rapidly undermine trust (Siti, Normala, Sheik & 
Obid, 2007). The perception that authority is trustworthy (or untrustworthy) has also been 
shown to be a function of whether the agency trusts (or distrusts) those from whom they 
are demanding cooperation and compliance. If those to be regulated are treated as 
trustworthy, they will be more likely to repay this respect by voluntary compliance with 
ethical requirements. A basic conclusion is that the behaviour of the revenue authority 
should be considered as a part of the overall treatment strategy for influencing taxpayer 
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behaviour. Each encounter with a taxpayer provides an opportunity for the agency to 
strengthen the loyalty and support of members of the public. Trust is a resource like no 
other; it is not depleted through use but rather through lack of use. 
2.3.4   Technology adoption 
Use of technology to file tax returns involves the process of forwarding tax information 
to a revenue authority electronically, often excludes the practice of having to submit 
paper documents. Currently, filing of tax returns by electronic systems is a government 
application that is being utilized with increasing frequency all over the world. Such 
arrangements are in particular useful for governments since they have the ability to 
reduce and even avoid the mistakes commonly committed by taxpayers during manual 
filings. They also fundamentally help to deter attempts to evade tax through data 
matching. (Machogu & Abayi, 2013) suggest that the data base developed using 
electronic tax filings can allow tax inspectors to analyze declarations more thoroughly, 
and enable policymakers to develop fairer and more efficient policies  
 All along, services by the government have always followed bureaucratic systems of 
management both in the third world economies and the developed nations. The principles 
of Weberian bureaucracy comprise of elements such as systematized hierarchy, 
establishment of uniform and objective approaches, proper division of labour and duty, 
and effectiveness in every aspect of processes. Every country has a bureaucratic state 
apparatuses; and besides the fact that the principles of bureaucracy aggressively motivate 
a number of commercial institutions, their effectiveness varies greatly (Palmer, 2002).  
But Okello (2001) states that whatever the level of effectiveness of the bureaucracy, the 
availability of computers to people from all walks of life has brought them better and 
53 
 
more convenient access to public services. Additionally, through the Internet and 
computer technology, governments can provide services in the original positive sense of 
Weberian bureaucracy. In other words, e-government can facilitate public service 
offerings in a truly standard, impersonal, efficient, and convenient manner for both the 
service provider (the government) and service recipients (the citizens). In some cases, a 
government agency can also be a service recipient of an e-government service. In 
economic terms, the ability of citizens to access government services anytime, anywhere 
helps to mitigate the transaction costs inherent in all types of government services. For 
web-based information systems to remain useful, they must contain new, enhanced 
attributes. There are several success criteria for a website depending on the variety of 
goals such as selling, informing and advertising. The authors further argue that website 
success is audience specific and it should take account of diverse perspectives of users 
and owners. It should be noted that sometimes these perspectives might be even 
competing. For example, in electronic tax filing systems, users are usually unenthusiastic 
to pay tax and the site owner (government) is eager to collect it (Machogu&Abayi, 2013). 
In their study of electronic tax filing system in Taiwan, Fu, et al.,, (2006) extend the 
technology acceptance model (TAM) to include the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
parameters as subjective norms, self-efficacy, resource facilitating conditions and 
techniques facilitating conditions. In yet another study, the same authors (Fu, et al.,, 
2004) compared user satisfaction with the three methods of tax filing (manual, a two-
dimensional barcode, Web-based) in Taiwan. According to such parameters as ease of 
data entry, correction, operation, learning and data submission, explanation completeness, 
filing form neatness and total deposition time.  
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According to Palmer (2002) electronic tax filing systems can be evaluated regarding 
usability, design and performance including download delay, navigability, site content, 
interactivity, responsiveness, and user satisfaction, the likelihood of a return to the 
website and frequency of use. According to Harold (2011), computer-generated returns, 
transmitted electronically, generally are easier to process than paper returns; since the 
information on the forms doesn't have to be keyed in, number by number, by IRS staff 
into the service's computers hence there is less chance of errors. Electronic transmittal is 
instantaneous, bypassing the frustrating vagaries of the postal system and the client 
receives confirmation within a day or two that the return not only was received by the 
IRS but was received accurately.  However, from an American experience, electronic tax 
filings' biggest advantage, from the taxpayer's point of view, is that it shortens the time 
for refunds from an average of 12 weeks to about three weeks (Palmer, 2002). Refunds 
can even be deposited directly into taxpayers' bank accounts. As an added incentive, 
some vendors that provide electronic filing services for tax preparers also offer a service 
in which clients due to a tax refund can apply for an immediate bank loan equal to the 
expected IRS check. As a result, a customer could receive the rebate (less bank and 
preparer fees) within three days of the filing (Machogu & Amayi, 2013). 
2.4   Conceptual Framework. 
Aggregate revenue of a major tax type (personal income tax, VAT, customs, etc.) is 
typically forecast by the expected growth in the tax base of the particular type of tax. This 
is assuming that the rate structure stays the same (or that there are no discretionary 
changes in the tax rate structure). For budgeting purposes, these forecasts form the base 
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case revenue before discretionary tax measures are considered. The results of these 
macro-models also enter into the monthly receipts forecasting models. 
In addition to a static tax structure, these forecasts also assume that there are no 
significant changes in the effectiveness of tax administration or tax compliance and that 
the structure of the economy is not changing in a way that affects tax yields. For example, 
the composition of consumption and imports remains relatively constant such that there is 
no significant shift towards, or away from, high tax rate goods or services. In general, the 
macro- or GDP-based forecasts are considered static forecasts in that they do not take 
into account any of the dynamic interactions that may be occurring between components 
of an economy as relative prices change over time. In most cases, such interactions are of 
the second order of magnitude, or have offsetting effects, and do not affect the results 
substantially. Care has to be taken, however, to look for major structural changes in an 
economy that may be occurring and causing significant shifts in the tax base. Two 
approaches can be used in macro- or GDP-based forecasting. The first approach is to 
estimate the growth in revenue that accompanies real economic growth (or growth in a 
macro proxy to the tax base) without any change in the tax structure (base, rates or 
exemptions.) This estimates the tax elasticity, and if the tax elasticity exceeds unity, then 
tax revenue tends to grow faster than economic growth, and conversely if the tax 
elasticity is less than unity. To estimate the tax elasticity of a tax type requires time series 
data. 
From the reviewed literature, it is evident of the existence of is a positive causal 
connection relating tax compliance to tax revenue. As used in the current study, the 
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relationship between revenue and the variables of concern can be presented in a general 
form as: 
Tr =f(TE, TS, CLE, T)……………………………………………………………….(2.1) 
The primary function can be interpreted as saying that with increased taxpayer education 
(TE), taxpayer services (TS), credible law enforcement (CLE) and adoption of 
technology (T), tax compliance will go up and this will translate into increased tax 
revenue. 
   Independent Variables 
 
 Dependent Variable 
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Effects of Tax Compliance Strategies on Tax Revenue 
Source: (Author, 2018). 
One of the strategies for enhancing voluntary tax compliance so as to increase tax 
revenue is to improve service delivery. Incidences of failure by the taxpayer to willingly 
comply with the required tax regulations forces the income management agencies to 
resort to rather expensive and punitive measure to ensure compliance is achieved and 
sustained. Provision of education to Taxpayers is one the mechanisms employed to assist 
taxpayers get a significant understanding of the tax requirements, processes and 
Tax Payer Education 
Taxpayer services 
Law enforcement 
Use of technology 
Level of Tax Revenue 
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procedures. This approach concerns itself with teaching of expert divisions within the 
income sections for providing education, counselling and assistance to the taxpayers. 
This is particularly done through a variety of channels of communication that includes 
newspapers, television, radio programs, websites, seminars, and front desk to facilitate 
effective communication and sharing of crucial information to the taxpayers. An effective 
and efficient program of taxpayer service activities is a critical objective of all revenue 
bodies. The commonly perceived difficulty of laws related to taxation accompanied with 
a vast and ever rising number of potential and active taxpayers to be served, has an 
implication that revenue authorities should rely significantly on taxpayers' willingness to 
honor his or her tax obligations as a precondition to realizing their desired revenue 
results. Consequently, taxpayers together with their associates need to be exposed to 
better levels of services in order for them  to be able define their responsibilities as the 
law requires and to implement procedures necessary to achieve or fulfil their obligations.  
Credible enforcement is an integral part of any compliance strategy as it acts not only to 
deter tax evasion but also to remind taxpayers that the tax collector is working to sustain 
a fair system of tax by making it possible for every taxpayer to honor their tax liabilities 
fairly. The law signifies and shapes the structure of the situation or circumstances within 
which a tax authority works and it is from this environment that we determine the 
uncertainties related to tax compliance that have a close link with the management of the 
tax law. The fundamental task for any effective revenue collection body is to manage the 
law in such a way as to ensure that overall community trust in their administration is 
sustained. Administration begins with the law in place which should be administered in a 
manner that sustains community confidence in their management. Electronic tax filing, or 
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e-filing, is a system for submitting tax documents to a revenue service electronically, 
often without the need to submit any paper documents. Electronic tax filing systems are 
an e-government application that is being utilized with increasing frequency all over the 
world. Such systems are particularly favorable for governments because they avoid many 
of the mistakes taxpayers make in manual filings, and they help to prevent tax evasion by 
data matching. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design, theoretical framework, the empirical model and 
estimation techniques used in the study. Furthermore, the chapter describes data types, 
sources, definition, measurement and how the data was analyzed. 
3.2 Research design 
The study adopted a non-experimental research design. Data was collected for different 
expenditures on tax compliance strategies from 1980 to 2015 in Kenya. The variables of 
interest were expenditures on taxpayer education, taxpayer services, law enforcement, 
and technology and government tax revenue. The data sources included the CRA and 
KRA publications. Least squares estimators are used to estimate the empirical model.  
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
The study adopted  the economic deterrence theory which points out that tax compliance 
depends on tax rate which determines the benefit of evasion, the probability of detection 
and the penalties that applied to fraud. According to this theory tax compliance (Tr) is a 
function of expenditure on credible law enforcement in (CLE), information on penalties 
and tax evasion benefits (TE) as shown in equations 3.1. Therefore, the theoretical model 
is given by; 
Tax compliance (Tr) = f (CLE, TE)………..………………………………………… (3.1) 
Where:  
Tr is tax revenue; while CLE is credible law enforcement and, TE is tax payer education. 
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In equation (3.1), tax compliance can be measured using government tax revenue. The 
government tax revenue is a good indicator of tax compliance as high compliance will 
lead to more tax revenue while low compliance will lead to low tax revenue. Therefore, 
tax revenue and tax compliance are expected to be positively correlated. On the other 
hand, the expenditure on law enforcement can increase the tax compliance by increasing 
the risk of tax avoidance. Therefore, expenditure on law enforcement can be used to 
indicate whether law enforcement is credible or not. Furthermore, the amount of 
information on penalties and benefits of tax evasion will depend on the expenditure on 
the taxpayer education. The higher the expenditure on taxpayer education the more the 
number of taxpayers who understand and appreciate the risk of tax evasion leading 
increased compliance and consequently tax revenues. 
3.4 Empirical Model 
The empirical model adopted by the study was derived from equation (3.1). From the 
literature review, other factors that affect tax compliance include services offered to tax 
payers (TS) and use of technology for tax administration (T). Inserting these factors in 
equation 3.1 yields the empirical model to be estimated. 
TR = f (CLE, TE, TS, T)………..…………………………………………………… (3.2) 
Where TR is government tax revenue, CLE is expenditure in law enforcement, TE is 
expenditure on taxpayer education, TS is the expenditure on services offered to 
taxpayers, and T is expenditure in technology used in tax administration. 
To determine the effect of each factor on tax revenue, equation (3.2) will be modified, to 
include an error term that captures other factors that are not included in the model. The 
econometric model estimated to answer the research questions is given by; 
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 ………………………………… (3.3) 
Where  is error term. The coefficient of expenditure on law enforcement, taxpayer 
education, and services offered, and use of technology in tax administration is expected 
to be positive. Equation (3.3) is estimated using OLS and it gives the long run 
relationship between government tax revenue and expenditure on law enforcement, 
taxpayer education, services offered, and tax administration. 
Several diagnostic tests were done to ensure estimated coefficients are consistent. 
Breusch-pagan test was used to test for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity, Variance 
Inflation Factor method is used. When the error term in equation (3.3) is found to be 
heteroscedastic, robust standard errors is used. Since data is in form of time series, the 
study tested for serial autocorrelation. The Jarque-Bera test was also conducted to test 
normality for the error term. 
3.4.1 Testing for Stationarity (Unit root Test) 
Most time series data exhibit non-stationary. It occurs when the mean and the variance of 
the time series data is not constant over time and hence it is impossible to interpret the 
results of OLS. Therefore, unit roots test was done to avoid the problem of the non-
stationarity, as it leads to spurious results. The study used Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test to test for stationarity. 
3.4.2 Variance Decomposition 
The variance decomposition show what percentage of the variation in a series is due to its 
own shocks and other variables in the model at the present and future periods (Enders, 
2004). The study used variance decompositions to study the importance of shock or 
innovation in tax compliance strategy in relation to tax revenue. 
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3.5 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Table 3.1 below shows the variables, their symbols and how they are measured 
Table 3.1 Variables used in the Model 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Tax revenues 
(TRt)  
Increase in real government tax 
revenue (GDP) Comparing 
consecutive periods 
yearly tax revenue as given in the 
economic survey at time t in  Kshs. 
Taxpayer 
education 
(TEt) 
Real expenditure on taxpayer 
education in (Ksh) comparing 
consecutive periods 
yearly expenditure on taxpayer 
education as given in the economic 
survey at time t in Kshs. 
Improved 
taxpayer 
services (TSt) 
Real expenditure on improving 
taxpayer services in 
(Ksh)comparing consecutive 
periods 
 yearly expenditure on taxpayer 
services as given in the economic 
survey at time t in Kshs. 
 Law  
Enforcement 
(LEt) 
Real expenditure on instituting 
tax compliance laws (Ksh) 
Comparing consecutive periods 
 yearly expenditure on tax 
compliance laws as given in the 
economic survey at time t in Kshs. 
Technology 
(Tt) 
Real expenditure on adoption of 
technology in taxation in (Ksh) 
comparing consecutive periods 
Yearly expenditure on technology 
as given in the economic survey at 
time t in (Kshs). 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
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3.6 Data Type, Source and Collection 
The study used time series data of Kenya government tax revenue collected for the period 
1980 to 2015. The data sources included CRA and KRA publications and Economic 
surveys. The data on expenditure on taxpayer education, taxpayer services, law 
enforcement and on technology was extracted from the publication and cleaned using 
Excel spreadsheet. Data on tax revenue was extracted from economic surveys. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings and discussions of the study. It presents the descriptive 
statistics, time series properties, diagnostic test and the results of the study.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Variables 
In time series analysis, descriptive analysis of data enables us to determine the variability 
of data so as to determine if the time series are susceptible for further statistical analysis. 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics (in millions).   
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Observations Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Taxpayer Education 36 37.22 9.57 20.00 49.00 
Taxpayer Services 36 29.06 7.44 16.00 38.00 
Credible Law Enforcement 36 62.50 16.11 34.00 82.00 
Adoption of Technology 36 76.33 19.65 42.00 101.00 
Tax Revenue 36 304,007.70 277,272.80 66,260.00 1,008,671.00 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
From Table 4.1 it can be seen that the mean of government expenditure on taxpayer 
education was KES 37.22million with a standard deviation of KES 9.57million. The 
largest expenditure on taxpayer education was KES 49.00 million and the lowest was 
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KES 20.00 million. The mean expenditure on taxpayer services was KES 29.06 million 
with a standard deviation of KES 7.44 million. The largest and the smallest expenditure 
on taxpayer services were KES 38.00 million and KES 16.00 million respectively. On the 
other hand, the expenditure on law enforcement by the tax authority was KES 62.50 
million with a standard deviation of KES 16.11 million. The respective largest and 
smallest values were KES 82.00 million and KES 34.00 million.  
The expenditure on the adoption of technology had a mean of KES 76.33 million with a 
standard deviation of KES 19.65million. The largest and the smallest expenditure on 
adoption of technology were KES 101.00 million and KES 42.00 million respectively. 
Lastly, the mean of tax revenue collection by the tax authority was KES 304,007.70 
million with a standard deviation of KES 277,272.80 million. The largest and the smallest 
tax revenue were KES 1,008,671.00 million and KES 66,260.00 million respectively. 
From the descriptive analysis of the time series above, it is evident that the time series are 
variable and can be subjected to further statistical analysis.  
4.3 Pre-Estimation Tests 
Before conducting the analysis, several pre-estimation tests were conducted. These 
included unit root test and correlation analysis. 
4.3.1 Stationarity Test 
To test for Stationarity, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was used. To conduct the 
ADF test, equation (4.1) was used. 
…………………………………………4.1 
The null and alternative hypotheses of the ADF test were; 
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 H0: ρ = 0 (Non-stationary) 
H1: ρ < 0. (Stationary) 
If the computed t-statistics is greater than the asymptotic critical values in absolute term, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and the study concludes that the series is stationary 
(Gujarati, 2004).  
Table 4.2: ADF Unit Root Test Results 
 
 
  Tax 
revenues 
Credible law 
enforcement 
Taxpayer 
education 
Taxpayer 
services 
Adoption of 
Technology 
Constant t-Statistic 4.1876 -1.7167 -1.7167 -1.7167 -1.7167 
 Prob. 1 0.4143 0.4143 0.4143 0.4143 
 Conclusion Non-
stationary 
Non-
stationary 
Non-
Stationary 
Non-
stationary 
Non-
Stationary 
Constant & Trend  t-Statistic 0.6667 -6.4338** -6.4338** -6.4338** -6.4338** 
 Prob. 0.9994 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Conclusion Non-
Stationary 
Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary 
** Indicates stationary at 5% level of significance 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
From the ADF test at level, credible law enforcement, taxpayer education, taxpayer 
services and adoption of technology are stationary at 5 percent level of significance. 
Therefore, using the ADF test the null hypothesis for the presence of a unit root was 
rejected at 5 per cent level of significance. However, the presence of a unit root was not 
rejected at 5 per cent level of significance for tax revenue, and hence was non-stationary. 
For tax revenue, ADF test was done at first difference. Table 4.3 shows the ADF test 
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results for all variables differenced once. The table shows that at first difference, all 
variables are stationary.  
Table 4.3: 1st Difference using ADF Stationarity Tests Results 
At First Difference 
  Tax revenues 
Constant t-Statistic -3.6789** 
 Prob. 0.0091 
 Conclusion Stationary 
Constant & Trend  t-Statistic -5.2654** 
 Prob. 0.0007 
 Conclusion Stationary 
** stationary at 5% levels of significance. 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
 
The 1
st
 difference of tax revenues is stationary at 5 percent level of significance. 
Therefore, tax revenues are integrated of order I (1). 
4.3.2 Correlation Analysis 
In regression analysis, multicollinearity tends to inflate the standard errors which affect 
the hypothesis testing. To test for multicollinearity between the variables, correlation 
analysis was done and variables with a correlation coefficient greater than 0.8 are deemed 
to be collinear. Table 4.4 shows the results of correlation analysis. 
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Table 4.4 Correlation Results 
  Taxpayer 
Education 
Technology 
adoption 
Law 
Enforcement 
Taxpayer 
Services 
Tax 
Revenue 
Taxpayer 
Education 
 
1.0000         
Technology 
adoption 
-0.0929 
(0.5955) 
 
1.0000 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Law 
Enforcement 
-0.0805 
(0.6457) 
-0.0258 
(0.8832) 
 
1.0000 
  
  
  
  
  
Taxpayer 
Services 
0.1460 
(0.4025) 
-0.5360 
(0.1119) 
-0.2567 
(0.1366) 
 
1.0000 
  
  
  
Tax 
Revenue 
  
-0.0213 
(0.9035) 
-0.1111 
(0.5253) 
0.2113 
(0.223) 
-0.0249 
(0.887) 
1.0000 
  
 
Significance level in the bracket and Variables in logarithms 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
Table 4.4 shows that the variables of the study are not highly correlated. None of the 
variables have correlation of 0.8 or higher. Tax revenue is positively correlated with law 
enforcement while it is negatively correlated to taxpayer education, adoption of 
technology and tax payer services. Taxpayer education is positively correlated to 
taxpayer services but negatively correlated to adoption of technology, law enforcement 
and tax revenues. Adoption of technology is negatively correlated to law enforcement, 
taxpayer services and tax revenues. 
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4.4 Regression Analysis 
The study estimated the effect of the expenditure on law enforcement, log of expenditure 
on taxpayer education, log of expenditure on taxpayer services, log of expenditure on use 
of Technology on the log of tax revenue. The regression output is presented in table 4.5.  
Table 4.5: Regression Output Summary for Tax Revenues on Various Variables 
Dependent Variable: Tax Revenue 
Independent Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Expenditure on Taxpayer Education  0.021043 0.570446 0.0005** 
Expenditure on the Use of Technology  0.246333 3.979523 0.0005** 
Expenditure on law Enforcement  0.003128 18.87002 0.0000** 
Improved Taxpayer Services  0.182391 -1.432906 0.1638 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.681577 
Durbin-Watson statistics:  1.911331 
F-Statistic                               12.82431 
Probability (F-statistic)         0.000012 
 
 (**) indicates that the effect is significant at 5%. The variables are in logs. 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
 
From Table 4.5, the variations in the independent variables jointly explain about 68.2 per 
cent of the variations in tax revenue in Kenya. This is shown by the adjusted R-squared 
of 68.2 per cent. The remaining 31.8 per cent of the variations in tax revenue in Kenya 
could be attributed to variables that are not captured in the model.  
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From Table 4.5, the coefficient of expenditure on the use of technology is 0.246333 and it 
has  value of 0.0005. This shows that the variable is significant at 5 per cent. The 
coefficient indicates that when the tax authority increases its expenditure on the use of 
technology in tax collection by 100 percent, the tax revenue increases by 24 percent. 
These findings are concurrent with the findings of Machogu & Amayi (2013) which 
argue that investments in technology by the tax authority increase tax revenues. It is also 
in agreement with the findings of Okello (2001) which argues that the ability of citizens 
to access government services anytime, anywhere helps to mitigate the transaction costs 
inherent in all types of government services and the findings of Palmer (2002) which 
argues electronic tax filings shortens the time for refunds from an average of 12 weeks to 
about 3 weeks thus enhancing the efficiency of tax collection.  
As for the Expenditure on law Enforcement, the coefficient was found to be positive 
0.003128 with a probability value of 0.0000. It was thus concluded that Expenditure on 
law Enforcement is highly significant at 5 percent. The magnitude implies that when the 
Expenditure on law Enforcement increase by 100 percent, the tax revenue to the 
government increases by about 0.3 percent. These findings are in agreement with the 
findings of Siti, Normala, Sheik & Obid (2007) which argues that paying taxes is a 
disincentive and must be enforced if sufficient tax revenue has to be raised from the 
taxpayers. 
From regression results, the coefficient of Expenditure on Taxpayer Education is positive 
0.021043 and it has a probability value of 0.0005. Therefore, the coefficient is significant 
at 5 percent. This finding are consistent with  the findings of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) and Becker (1968) which found that governments should sensitize the people on 
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matter relating to tax payment and tax compliance to increase the tax revenue From the 
study findings, we can conclude that Expenditure on Taxpayer Education has a 
significant effect on the tax revenues in Kenya. The implication of this is that the 
government should pay close attention to tax education to enhance awareness in order to 
ensure that higher levels of tax revenue are realized. 
However, the spending of the tax authority on Improved Taxpayer Services is found not 
to be statistically significant in explaining the variations in tax revenue in Kenya. These 
findings are in contrast with the results of Mikessel (2013) which found out that an 
effective and efficient program of taxpayer service activities is a critical objective of all 
revenue bodies. The overall complexity of tax laws coupled with the relatively large 
populations of taxpayers to be served means that all income agencies must rely 
substantially on taxpayers' voluntary compliance to achieve the outcomes expected of 
them. It is axiomatic that to achieve high levels of voluntary compliance, taxpayers and 
their representatives must have a good standard of services to help them determine their 
obligations under the laws and to complete the steps required to acquit those obligations. 
4.5 Post Estimation Diagnostic Tests 
One model was estimated by OLS and the residual were tested for normality, serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. The model dependent variable was tax revenue while 
independent variables log of expenditure on taxpayer education, log of expenditure on the 
use of technology, log of expenditure on law enforcement, log of expenditure on 
improved taxpayer services. 
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Table 4.6: Normality test, Heteroscedasticity, and Serial Correlation 
(Sources: Author, 2018). 
Residual based tests were conducted to test for the normality and presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The results of these tests are reported in table 4.6. 
The Jarque-Bera statistic from the histogram-normality test was 36.75279 with a p-value 
of 0.995510. The probability value was greater than 0.05 and so the null hypothesis of 
normality of the regression residuals could not be rejected at 5 per cent significance level. 
Conclusion was thus made that the regression residuals from the estimated equation 
followed a normal distribution.  
The study tested for the presence of autocorrelation for the estimated equation by the use 
of the Breusch-Godfrey langrage multiplier test. This method is due to Breusch (1978) 
and Godfrey (1978) is capable of handling higher order autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2004; 
Greene 2008). As shown in table 4.6, the higher probability values for the Observed R-
Squared for the Breusch-Godfrey tests showed that the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in the models could not be rejected. This implies that there was no serial 
correlation in the residual series from the regression. 
Type of test  Test Statistic Values  
Histogram-Normality Test Jarque-Bera 0.009001 
Probability  0.995510 
ARCH LM Test P-value of the Observed* R-Squared 1.995156 
Probability of Chi-square  0.7366 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for Serial 
Correlation   
F-statistic 1.919537 
Probability 0.3830 
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Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) is said to be present in the case 
where the magnitude of the regression residual is related to that of the recent residuals. If 
this occurs, there would be an estimation efficiency loss (Greene, 2008). The LM test for 
no ARCH was conducted and it included up to fifth lagged value of residuals per 
equation. For both of the equation, the p-value of the Observed* R-Squared was found to 
be greater than 0.05. The null hypothesis could not be rejected at 5 per cent significance 
level implying that each of the residuals series exhibited no heteroskedasticity problems. 
4.5.1 Model Specification and Stability Tests 
Table 4.7: Ramsey RESET Tests Results for the Model 
Dependent Variable No. of terms  Test statistic Conclusion 
F-statistic Prob.(F-stat) 
Tax revenues  1  0.203192 0.6560 No 
misspecification 
error evidence 
2 0.114465 0.8923 
(Source: Author, 2018). 
Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) was proposed by Ramsey (1969) to 
determine the departure from the classical linear regression assumptions. The preceding 
sections entailed a discussion on the individual tests such as normality tests, 
heteroskedasticity tests and serial correlation.  All the three tests pointed out the models 
are statistically sound. To detect specification errors in an equation which could have 
been wrongly specified but nevertheless gives satisfactory conventional tests, Ramsey 
and Alexander (1984) proposed RESET as a general test for omitted variables alongside 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term and incorrect functional 
form. The Ramsey RESET test was conducted for the estimated model. The p-values of 
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the F-statistic was greater than 0.05.  Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the fitted values were all zero at 5 percent level of significance was not rejected. Based 
on the result it was concluded that there was no specification errors in the model.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This study was conducted to establish the effects of tax compliance strategies on the level 
of tax revenue in Kenya. Specifically, it aimed to: establish the effect of taxpayer 
education on the level of tax revenue in Kenya; determine the effect of improved 
taxpayer services on the level of tax revenue in Kenya; assess the impact of law 
enforcement on the level of tax revenue in Kenya; and determine the effect of the use of 
technology on the level of tax revenue in Kenya. The motivation for conducting the study 
was the fact that while the government of Kenya has over time pursued a battery of 
policy measures to realize higher tax productivity, over the years, the government has run 
deficit budgeting.  
The study used secondary sources of data on all the variables for the period 1980 to 2015. 
One empirical model was estimated corresponding to the study objectives. Diagnostic 
tests including residual property tests, stability and normality tests were conducted on the 
model emanating from the estimation before their adoption. The test results regarding 
their statistical appropriateness helped to qualify the model.   
The results of the study show that expenditure by the tax authority on the use of 
technology has a positive effect on the tax revenue. On a similar note, expenditure on law 
enforcement and the expenditure on taxpayer education are also found to be highly 
significant in explaining variations in tax revenue. The relationship between the three was 
positive which implies that as the tax authority increases its expenditure on law 
enforcement, it is expected that its revenues will grow. Contrary to these findings was the 
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fact that the study found that the expenditure of the tax authority on Improved Taxpayer 
Services is not significant in explaining the variations in tax revenues.  
The three variables, spending by the tax administration on the use of technology, the 
expenditure on law enforcement and the expenditure on tax education had positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. This means that as Kenya's tax authority increases its 
expenditure on purchase and acquisition of technology, on law enforcement and 
sensitization, it is likely to realize more in revenue.  
5.2 Policy Recommendations  
This section discusses the implications of the findings of this study for policy. First, the 
study found a positive relationship between the expenditure on purchase and acquisition 
of technology and the tax revenue that Kenya's tax authority collected in any given year. 
The implication of this is that technology enhances the efficacy of tax collection. Thus, 
the government should spend more on acquiring technology which will help in the 
administration of the tax system. This is in agreement with the findings of (Machogu & 
Abayi, 2013) who argue that electronic tax filing systems are particularly favourable for 
governments because they avoid many of the mistakes taxpayers make in manual filings, 
and they help to prevent fraud by data matching. The data houses developed using 
electronic tax filings can allow tax inspectors to analyze declarations more thoroughly, 
and enable policymakers to develop fairer and more efficient policies. 
Secondly, the study found that there is a positive relationship between the expenditure by 
the tax authority on law enforcement and the tax revenue collected. The implication of 
this is that the government should continue to up its tax compliance enforcement efforts. 
This will help it curb tax evasion and underreporting which may lead to low tax revenue 
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realization. Credible law enforcement is an integral part of any compliance strategy as it 
acts not only to deter tax evasion but also to remind taxpayers that the tax collector is 
working to maintain the fairness of the tax system by ensuring that all pay their fair share. 
Administration begins with the law in place. The law represents a component of the 
context or environment in which a revenue authority operates and it is from this 
environment that we discern the compliance risks associated with the administration of 
the law. The challenge for revenue agencies is to administer the law in a manner that 
sustains community confidence in their administration.  
It is further recommended that the state pursues alternative measures in its quest to 
improve on the level of tax efficiency and effectiveness Therefore, the administration of 
coercive measures such as fines and other non-compliance costs should be encouraged to 
minimize further delayed payment of the tax liabilities. It therefore follows that tax audits 
by tax management agencies should be considered necessary and compulsory, 
specifically when non-compliance is detected or suspected to have been committed by the 
tax paying entity be ignorantly or intentionally. The concept non-compliance has always 
been emphasized by the policy changes geared to punish, such as the regular tax audits 
and percentage fines.Unfortunately, the theoretical instrument employed could not 
extensively predict and give a comprehensive account of the taxpayer reluctant attitude 
and more often refusal to comply with tax payment. Several empirical studies to explain 
the complex and unpredictable tendency of adherence to tax regulations in more genuine 
circumstances have been carried out. These studies concerned themselves with the 
elements that influence compliance or levels of non-compliance.  
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Thirdly, the study found that there is a positive relationship between expenditure by the 
tax authority on tax education and tax revenue collected. The implication of this is that 
the government should continue to up its taxpayer sensitization efforts. This will help to 
enlighten and emphasize to the citizenry that tax payment is an obligation to all. 
Taxpayer education program is one of the strategies of improving service delivery to the 
taxpayers. Improving service delivery is critical to enhancing voluntary tax compliance. 
Thus, taxpayer education should be designed to enable taxpayers to understand tax laws 
and procedures. 
Non-compliance may be unintentional, where the taxpayer is not aware of his/her tax 
obligations or fails to fulfill his/her tax obligations due to ignorance of tax laws and 
procedures; or intentional, due to the compliance attitudes. It is expected that tax 
education will enable the taxpayer to understand tax laws and procedures and create a 
positive tax compliance attitude and should be directed towards behavioral change.  
5.3 Areas of Further Research  
The study sought to establish the effects of tax compliance strategies on the level of tax 
revenue in Kenya. The findings emanating from the study point out to the fact that the 
use of technology, law enforcement and tax education practices are healthy for the 
authority of income to realize high tax revenues. The study has recommended that the 
government should scale up its expenditure on these avenues. However, the study fails to 
determine a cap on the expenditure. Further studies should seek to determine the optimal 
expenditure that will ensure that the highest possible tax revenue is realized. For instance, 
such study should give a tradeoff between tax revenues and the respective expenditures 
on technology use, education and law enforcement. This is because, from economic 
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theory, there must be a limit beyond which expenditure on these items can turn out to be 
counterproductive. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1:  DATA 
Table A1: Time Series Data Used in the Study 
Year  Taxpayer 
Education 
Taxpayer 
Services 
Credible Law 
Enforcement 
Adoption Of 
Technology 
Tax 
Revenue 
1980 20,352,688 15,875,097 34,192,516 41,723,011 77,798,6
94,856 
1981 20,516,823 16,003,122 34,468,262 42,059,487 76,358,4
17,536 
1982 22,685,244 17,694,490 38,111,209 46,504,749 71,615,0
96,886 
1983 22,868,189 17,837,187 38,418,558 46,879,788 66,259,7
48,315 
1984 23,052,610 17,981,036 38,728,385 47,257,850 70,177,9
82,506 
1985 25,489,038 19,881,449 42,821,583 52,252,527 70,943,0
75,425 
1986 25,694,594 20,041,784 43,166,919 52,673,919 82,998,4
02,296 
1987 25,901,809 20,203,411 43,515,039 53,098,708 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98,672,2
30,457 
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1988 28,639,368 22,338,707 48,114,139 58,710,705 106,000,
184,643 
1989 28,870,331 22,518,858 48,502,156 59,184,178 104,148,
413,515 
1990 29,103,156 22,700,462 48,893,302 59,661,470 112,030,
125,497 
1991 32,179,065 25,099,671 54,060,830 65,967,084 143,660,
548,424 
1992 32,438,574 25,302,088 54,496,804 66,499,077 151,107,
496,710 
1993 32,700,175 25,506,137 54,936,295 67,035,359 86,079,1
05,124 
1994 36,156,253 28,201,878 60,742,505 74,120,319 106,760,
676,960 
1995 36,447,836 28,429,312 61,232,364 74,718,064 185,398,
348,817 
1996 36,741,770 28,658,581 61,726,174 75,320,629 190,897,
646,674 
1997 40,625,004 31,687,503 68,250,006 83,281,257 210,667,
815,391 
1998 40,952,625 31,943,047 68,800,409 83,952,880 212,247,
646,467 
1999 41,282,888 32,200,652 69,355,251 84,629,920 208,327,
88 
 
906,243 
2000 45,646,071 35,603,936 76,685,400 93,574,447 213,845,
694,482 
2001 46,014,185 35,891,064 77,303,831 94,329,079 231,563,
559,737 
2002 46,385,267 36,180,508 77,927,249 95,089,798 227,384,
969,714 
2003 46,759,342 36,472,287 78,555,694 95,856,651 234,981,
230,123 
2004 47,136,433 36,766,418 79,189,208 96,629,688 273,183,
265,171 
2005 47,516,566 37,062,921 79,827,831 97,408,960 349,845,
111,890 
2006 47,899,764 37,361,816 80,471,603 98,194,516 391,036,
238,155 
2007 48,286,052 37,663,121 81,120,568 98,986,407 484,547,
015,639 
2008 48,675,456 37,966,856 81,774,766 99,784,685 573,016,
083,651 
2009 49,068,000 38,273,040 82,434,240 100,589,400 575,507,
970,791 
2010 42,213,000 32,926,140 70,917,840 86,536,650 629,328,
410,902 
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2011 43,057,260 33,584,663 72,336,197 88,267,383 669,060,
185,080 
2012 43,918,405 34,256,356 73,782,921 90,032,731 800,431,
299,317 
2013 44,796,773 34,941,483 75,258,579 91,833,385 868,653,
388,680 
2014 44,357,589 34,598,920 74,520,750 90,933,058 981,073,
037,056 
2015 45,244,741 35,290,898 76,011,165 92,751,719 1,008,67
0,955,80 
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